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Originalism Isn’t What It Used to Be: The 
Nondelegation Doctrine, Originalism, and 
Government by Judiciary  
Kurt Eggert 
“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the 
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those 
who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the 
others. . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”  
– James Madison1 
“[Originalism’s] greatest defect, in my view, is the difficulty of 
applying it correctly. . . [I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb 
the original understanding of an ancient text.”  
– Justice Antonin Scalia2 
“[Montesquieu’s] meaning, as his own words import, and still 
more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can 
amount to no more than this, that where the WHOLE power of one 
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the 
WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental 
principles of a free constitution are subverted.” – James Madison3 
“I’m an originalist; I’m a textualist; I’m not a nut.”  
– Justice Antonin Scalia4 
 
  Professor of Law and Director of the Alona Cortese Elder Law Center at Chapman 
University Fowler School of Law. J.D., UC Berkeley School of Law, 1984. B.A., Rice 
University, 1981. I would like to thank Clare Pastore for her invaluable comments and 
editing help on this Article. I would also like to thank Scott Altman, Steve Hitchcock, Joel 
Farrell, Katherine Eggert, and Nicholas Westberg for their thoughtful comments and 
Laura Fry for her advice on research methods. This Article was presented at the 2021 
Chapman Law Review annual symposium, A Discussion on the Nondelegation and 
Chevron Deference Doctrine, and I appreciate the comments of the other panelists in the 
session on nondelegation, Richard Epstein and Jack Beermann, and the moderator Tom 
Campbell. Members of the Chapman Law Review have provided outstanding editing and 
support, especially Sirine Yared and Ariel Romero. Any errors are of course mine. 
 1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 268 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
 2 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989). 
 3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 251 (James Madison) (emphasis in the original). 
 4 Jeremy Telman, Explication Du Texte: "I'm An Originalist; I'm A Textualist; I'm 
Not A Nut", 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 629, 629 (2016). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The originalist defenders of the nondelegation doctrine, the 
purported constitutional rule that Congress cannot delegate its 
legislative rule-making power to federal agencies, have 
constructed an elaborate myth to justify that doctrine, which is 
found nowhere in the Constitution. According to the originalist 
myth, John Locke articulated that doctrine in his Second 
Treatise of Government of 16895 and so influenced the Framers 
of the Constitution that they somehow worked it implicitly and 
invisibly into the Constitution. And hence the Constitution’s 
original meaning includes the nondelegation doctrine. Such 
nondelegation defenders assert that the Constitution strictly 
limits the delegation of legislative power by Congress, even if it 
does not prohibit it entirely, and that there is a veritable trove of 
evidence showing that the nondelegation doctrine was firmly 
established at the Founding. Some treat James Madison as the 
patron saint of the separation of powers and argue that the fact 
that Madison unsuccessfully attempted to include the 
nondelegation doctrine in the Constitution shows that it is 
somehow inherent in that document. 
None of that myth is true. Or rather, the available historical 
evidence strongly indicates that the myths asserted by such 
defenders of the nondelegation doctrine are false. Locke’s 
greatest influence on the colonists came before the Revolution, at 
a time when the colonists were considering whether to revolt 
from Britain. Once the Revolutionary War started, Locke’s 
influence in the colonies plummeted. At the Constitutional 
Convention, Locke had little apparent influence, and even that 
seems to have been on the Anti-Federalists, rather than with the 
Framers. The drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution little 
discussed the delegation of legislative powers, let alone what 
limits there should be to such delegation. Madison was far more 
concerned, even fearful, that Congress would encroach on the 
powers of the Executive and the Judiciary than he was about 
Congress excessively delegating its powers. Madison even urged 
including in the Constitution provisions that would have 
mandated that some legislative policy-making power be 
delegated to the Executive and the judiciary, in the form of a 
Council of Revision, a council made up of the Executive and 
selected members of the national judiciary to exercise what was 
then called the revisionary power.  
 
 5 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 141 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
1980). 
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When a nondelegation provision was proposed at the 
Constitutional Convention, it was rejected. When an amendment 
was proposed to the Constitution as part of the Bill of Rights that 
would have prohibited each branch of the government from 
employing the powers of another branch, it was rejected by the 
Senate. Congress, since its inception, has delegated legislative 
power with relative abandon, and doing so was not held 
unconstitutional until 1935 and never again after that year. 
Why would originalists push such obvious and unconvincing 
myths? How could a supposed “constitutional doctrine” rejected for 
the Constitution and which has been meaningly employed only 
twice even be said to exist in any meaningful way? Worse yet, why 
does it appear that, to seize greater control of America’s governance, 
the now starkly conservative Supreme Court may well use 
originalism to justify creating a brand new and robust version of the 
long dormant nondelegation doctrine? This novel creation would be, 
some originalists argue, justified by then-secret debates at the 
Constitutional Convention, by a pre-Revolutionary War pamphlet 
arguing that Parliament should recognize the legislative power of 
colonial legislatures, by a personal letter written decades later 
about the influences on the Revolution, by a hoary misunderstood 
agency maxim that seems to have sprung from a medieval printing 
error, by one of Locke’s writings that little influenced the drafters of 
the Constitution, by early legislation that actually delegated 
legislative power, and by court cases well after the Founding that 
permitted legislative delegation, among other unconvincing sources.  
To explain why originalist defenders would defend a 
nondelegation doctrine unsupported by evidence at the Founding, 
this article examines another myth, that of originalism itself, the 
idea that the “intentions of the founders” as a group of drafters or 
ratifiers or that the original public meaning of words in the 
Constitution can be ascertained in such an accurate and 
meaningful way that they should determine the meaning of the 
Constitution. This article also criticizes the idea that the 
Supreme Court should rely on its own judgement of arcane and 
disputed historical facts and the complex context in which they 
occurred as a basis to overturn centuries of its own precedent in 
interpreting the Constitution. These two myths, the myth of the 
nondelegation doctrine and the myth of an originalist method 
valid enough to breathe life into it, wind around and support 
each other. The nondelegation doctrine would remain dormant if 
not dead but for originalism. A revived nondelegation doctrine 
would be originalism’s greatest triumph, as it would give an 
originalist Supreme Court a self-created, ill-defined, and 
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virtually uncontrollable license to overturn any regulatory 
legislation that the Court disfavored for policy reasons.  
A revived nondelegation doctrine would transform the 
Supreme Court into a far more powerful version of the rejected 
Council of Revision, a proposal that was scrapped at the 
Convention because it would have turned judges into legislators, 
violated the separation of powers, and upset the balance of those 
powers. A new robust nondelegation doctrine would go even 
further, as no one could override the veto power that the 
Supreme Court would give itself anytime Congress directed 
federal agencies to craft regulations and make decisions that the 
Court decides Congress should make for itself. The Court would 
not have to share this mighty veto power with the President, nor 
could Congress override the Court’s veto. The Court would be 
granting itself an awesome policy power that would be almost 
impossible for Congress to resist or the people to remove, because 
the doctrine would be considered an implicit constitutional 
doctrine that must be enforced both on Congress and on the 
Executive Branch. And it is hard to imagine that the 
Constitution would be amended to remove the nondelegation 
doctrine, something that is not even there.  
If the Supreme Court creates a robust nondelegation 
doctrine, it would seize the power to control the size of the 
administrative state and the scope of regulatory legislation in a 
way not authorized by the Constitution, rejected by the founders 
when they rejected the Council of Revision, and virtually 
untouchable by the people themselves or the members of 
Congress who represent them. Originalism would have seized 
power for a “Government by Judiciary,” the very danger which 
was the original basis for originalism and was the title of the 
“manifesto of originalism,” Raoul Berger’s 1977 book that helped 
spark the originalist movement, a book warning of the grave 
peril of the Supreme Court Justices seizing such policy-making 
power and imposing their will on the nation by revising 
constitutional mandates to fit their policy preferences.6 
This article uses the current debate about delegation at the 
Founding and the new evidence uncovered, including evidence 
that this article brings to this debate, to examine whether the 
original intent or original public meaning at the Founding should 
be a deciding factor in a court’s decision about the nondelegation 
 
 6 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 417 (1977) (“Among the most fundamental [principles of the 
Constitution] is the exclusion of the judiciary from policymaking.”).  
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doctrine. To the debate over delegation or nondelegation at the 
Founding, this article adds a comprehensive analysis of 
Madison’s changing and contradictory views on the separation of 
powers and the usefulness and effect of an express nondelegation 
doctrine in the Constitution, his grave fear that Congress would 
usurp the powers of the other branches, and his support of a 
proposed Council of Revision, which would have constitutionally 
mandated the delegation of some legislative power to a council 
made up of the Executive and a group of judges.  
Madison at various times attempted to add an express 
nondelegation or alternatively a non-encroachment doctrine to 
the Constitution, the latter of which would have forbidden one 
branch of government from usurping the powers of the other 
branches.7 Madison also argued that express doctrines in 
constitutions are ineffective protections against the 
accumulations of the various powers in one branch. At least once, 
he also asserted that limitations on delegation are mandated by 
the Constitution despite their absence from the Constitution.  
The Article also uses decades of work by historians to 
disprove a central claim of originalists that Locke and his Second 
Treatise were a great influence on the drafting of the 
Constitution. The consensus view among historians now seems to 
be that Locke’s influence in America plummeted with the start of 
the Revolutionary Warand that his Second Treatise had little 
influence on the drafting or ratification of the Constitution. 
Without the crutch of Locke’s Second Treatise, originalists have 
virtually no evidence that the Constitution was intended to 
contain an implicit nondelegation doctrine.8 The Article further 
argues that the Court enforcing a robust nondelegation doctrine 
would constitute judicially amending the Constitution to include 
restrictions and principles not only absent from the Constitution 
but also that the Framers and the First Congress expressly 
rejected.  
This Article uses the nondelegation debate as a lens to see 
whether originalism as it is currently practiced is a useful or 
dangerous tool of constitutional interpretation. It builds on 
existing criticisms of originalism and how it has morphed largely 
from a theory of judicial restraint into an antimajoritarian call to 
judicial action, urging “judicial fortitude,” the conservative term 
 
 7 CAROL BERKIN, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE FIGHT TO SECURE AMERICA'S LIBERTIES 
152 (2016). 
 8 Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282 (2021). 
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for judicial activism and the idea that the Court should actively 
assert its judicial power in an effort to rein in the administrative 
state.9 Justice Gorsuch, in a recent dissent, argued that the 
Court should exhibit “fortitude” in reviving the nondelegation 
doctrine,10 very different from the judicial restraint Justice Scalia 
applied to nondelegation. Many have noted that originalism can 
be used as a mere cloak to hide courts’ asserting their policy 
preferences in the guise of honoring the intent of the Founders, 
and that while originalists once urged judicial restraint, now 
many applaud a now conservative Supreme Court striking down 
legislation enacted by Congress. However, this Article makes a 
separate point, that the “judicial fortitude” some originalists 
encourage directly violates the limited and non-policy-making 
role of the Court as expressed in the Founding Era.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the history of 
the nondelegation doctrine, its absence in the Constitution, the 
various theories designed to explain its existence, and the mere lip 
service it has received from the Court, other than during a single 
year. It then discusses Madison’s various efforts to include both a 
nondelegation doctrine and a non-encroachment amendment in 
the text of the Constitution, as well as his support for the creation 
of a Council of Revision, which would have delegated some 
legislative power to the Executive and a group of judges. Locke’s 
nondelegation mandate and historians’ assessment of what little 
influence it seems to have had on the Framers is also discussed, as 
well as other explanations and justifications for a constitutional 
nondelegation doctrine.  
Part II recounts the origins of originalism, its initial 
emphasis on judicial restraint and on the avoidance of interfering 
in legislative policy-making. Then, it discusses how originalism’s 
initial focus on the framers’ original intent was rejected by many 
originalist theorists and replaced, first with the understanding of 
the ratifiers of the Constitution and then with the original public 
meaning of the words of the Constitution. The Article discusses 
the unworkable difficulty of putting modern originalism into 
practice. It also discusses how the many forms and mutations of 
originalism allow judges to choose how to apply originalism to 
achieve their favored policy results. 
 
 9 See generally PETER J. WALLISON, JUDICIAL FORTITUDE: THE LAST CHANCE TO 
REIN IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 109–36 (2018) (asserting the importance of a revived 
nondelegation doctrine to control the power of federal agencies). 
 10 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., joined by 
Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 12:57 PM 
2021] Originalism Isn’t What It Used to Be 713 
Part III examines how originalism works in practice in 
justifying and discussing the nondelegation doctrine. It reviews 
the originalist concurrences and dissents regarding 
nondelegation that some Supreme Court Justices have authored 
in recent decades, applying a flawed, primitive form of 
originalism sometimes based on historical error or lack of 
context. Then the Article concludes with an analysis of originalist 
scholars’ attempts to justify the nondelegation doctrine and what 
their attempts show about the flaws and challenges of employing 
originalism as a method of constitutional analysis.  
II. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE, ITS MYSTERIOUS HISTORY, 
AND THE STAKES OF THE CURRENT DEBATE  
The nondelegation doctrine was succinctly stated by Justice 
Harlan in 1892: “That congress cannot delegate legislative 
power . . . is a principle universally recognized as vital to the 
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained 
by the Constitution.”11 This assertion has been often repeated, 
even recently by Justice Scalia in a unanimous decision by the 
Supreme Court, stating “‘Article I, § 1, of the Constitution vests 
‘[a]ll legislative Power herein granted . . . in a Congress of the 
United States’ . . . [and] permits no delegation of those powers.”12 
Defenders of the nondelegation doctrine typically use three 
arguments in their defense: “the separation of powers, public 
accountability, or the text of the U.S. Constitution.”13 Reasons 
given for the associated separation of powers doctrine are 
governmental efficiency, keeping government powers in balance, 
and assuring that law is made for the common good.14 If the 
nondelegation doctrine is vital to the structure of government, it 
serves as “a prophylactic measure against tyranny. . .”15 To these 
should be added the claim that the original intent of the Framers 
mandates a nondelegation doctrine, absent even words in the 
Constitution expressly stating that. 
The nondelegation doctrine appears nowhere in the Constitution, 
leading to questions about whether it is in fact a constitutional 
mandate. Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley boldly assert: 
 
 11 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). 
 12 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
art. I, §1). 
 13 Joseph Postell, "The People Surrender Nothing": Social Compact Theory, 
Republicanism, and the Modern Administrative State, 81 MO. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2016). 
 14 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers As Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 1994 (2011). 
 15 Martin H. Redish, Pragmatic Formalism, Separation of Powers, and the Need to 
Revisit the Nondelegation Doctrine, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 383 (2019). 
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“The nondelegation doctrine has nothing to do with the Constitution as 
it was originally understood. You can be an originalist or you can be 
committed to the nondelegation doctrine. But you can’t be both.”16 
Posner and Vermeule make the straightforward claim that the 
“nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional text and 
structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound economic and 
political theory.”17 Why do we have the nondelegation doctrine, then? 
Their reply: “Nondelegation is nothing more than a controversial 
theory that floated around the margins of nineteenth-century 
constitutionalism—a theory that wasn’t clearly adopted by the 
Supreme Court until 1892, and even then only in dictum.”18 
As the Supreme Court is now filled with Justices with an 
originalist bent, a fraught question or a great opportunity, 
depending on whom you ask, is whether the Court will finally set 
in place a stricter, more robust nondelegation doctrine. A strict 
nondelegation doctrine could, as Elena Kagan noted, render most 
of government unconstitutional, “dependent as Congress is on the 
need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its 
programs.”19 As a law professor, now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett 
and her co-author stated, “Adherence to originalism arguably 
requires, for example, the dismantling of the administrative 
state. . . . Originalists have been pressed to either acknowledge 
that their theory could generate major disruption or identify a 
principled exception . . .” explaining why judges should not be 
bound by the Constitution’s original public meaning.20 
Some originalists and others opposed to expansive nature of 
the administrative state harbor hopes that if a majority of the 
Court adopt an originalist view of the nondelegation doctrine, 
they will decide that it must be more strictly applied and so trim 
what they perceive as the dangerous power of federal agencies. 
For example, Peter Wallison argues that, without a stricter 
nondelegation jurisprudence, “forcing Congress to do the difficult 
work of legislating, we are headed ultimately for a form of 
government in which a bureaucracy in Washington – and not 
Congress – will make the major policy decisions for the 
 
 16 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 282.  
 17 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002). 
 18 Id. (citing Field v. Clark, 143 US 649, 692 (1892)). 
 19 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019). 
 20 Amy C. Barrett & John C. Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1, 1–2 (2016). The authors, though, emphasize “We do not ourselves undertake to 
examine how any of the precedents we mention would fare under an originalist 
analysis.” Id. at 2 n.1. 
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country.”21 Wallison calls such strong measures “judicial 
fortitude,”22 a term much more palatable to originalists than 
judicial activism. 
The recent dissent of Justice Gorsuch in Gundy indicating 
interest in revitalizing the nondelegation doctrine has kicked up 
the interest in an originalist approach to the doctrine into a fever 
pitch.23 Justice Gorsuch attempting to revive the nondelegation 
doctrine should have come as no surprise since he had twice 
discussed the doctrine while serving on the 10th Circuit.24 Justice 
Alito, concurring in Gundy, also indicated interest in reviving the 
nondelegation doctrine.25 Gary Lawson noted in 2019, “And while 
you never count your votes until they are cast, it is very hard to 
read Gundy and not count to five under your breath.”26 With new 
Justice Amy Comey Barrett, the number might well be six.  
The nondelegation doctrine has been one of the main 
battlegrounds “upon which the constitutionality of the growth of 
federal regulatory authority was tested”27 and that battle is now 
heated. Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent28 raises the question of 
whether a now much more conservative Court will restrict 
Congress’s ability to draft the kind of regulatory legislation that 
is dependent on delegating significant rule-making authority to 
federal agencies. Advocates for a stricter nondelegation doctrine 
have argued that an unchecked administrative state without 
restrictions like a robust nondelegation doctrine would be “in the 
Framers’ eyes, tyrannical and illegitimate,”29 and that the 
nondelegation doctrine could check what C. Boyden Gray called 
 
 21 See WALLISON, supra note 9, at 114. 
 22 Id. at 166. 
 23 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2116. 
 24 See United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 948 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). See also United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 668 (10th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). In Nichols, then-Judge 
Gorsuch in a dissent stated, “There's “[t]here's ample evidence, too, that the framers of 
the Constitution thought the compartmentalization of legislative power not just a tool of 
good government or necessary to protect the authority of Congress from encroachment by 
the Executive but essential to the preservation of the people's liberty.” Id. 
 25 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this 
Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I 
would support that effort.”). 
 26 Gary Lawson, “I'm Leavin' It (All) Up To You”: Gundy and the (Sort-Of) 
Resurrection of The Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 33 (2019). 
 27 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 479 (1989). 
 28 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 29 D.A. Candeub, Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 94 (2017) 
(“Administrative law will continue to sit uneasily with our legal and constitutional 
traditions and remain, in the Framers' eyes, tyrannical and illegitimate.”). 
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the “unprecedented expansion of the administrative state.”30 A 
more robust nondelegation doctrine could change the United 
States’ policy on a myriad of issues, including environmental 
protection, financial services oversight, and occupational health 
and safety.31 It could strike cost containment strategies in 
Medicare and under Obamacare,32 parts of economic relief 
programs like the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)33 and 
financial regulation like Dodd Frank.34  
However, there is a gigantic sticking point to the originalist 
push to revive the nondelegation doctrine. Originalists assert 
that the meaning of the Constitution was fixed at its ratification 
(and the meaning of each amendment fixed at the time it was 
passed). Hence, originalists must prove that the Constitution 
contained a rule against delegation when it was ratified. 
However, the Constitution is silent on whether Congress can 
delegate its legislative power, and even originalists disagree 
whether it can.35 How can the Constitution mean something it is 
silent about? One of the strongest defenses of originalism is 
based on the fact that the Constitution is a written text, and that 
originalism is somehow mandated by it being a written 
constitution.36 How can originalism then purport to justify a 
doctrine not written in the Constitution? 
If the Framers had wanted to limit Congress’s delegation of 
its legislative powers, they had several choices. One option is 
that they could have included the nondelegation doctrine as an 
express term in the Constitution or an early amendment thereto. 
This was proposed and rejected during the Constitutional 
Convention and a similar non-encroachment clause, forbidding 
each branch from using powers of another branch, was rejected 
 
 30 C. Boyden Gray, The Nondelegation Canon's Neglected History and 
Underestimated Legacy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 619, 646 (2015). 
 31 Id. at 620–21 (“Correcting those misconceptions [about the nondelegation 
doctrine] is crucial, not just for abstract constitutional debate, but more importantly, for 
the regulatory policy choices the United States government now faces.”). 
 32 Ilya Shapiro & Carl G. DeNigris, Occupy Pennsylvania Avenue: How the Government's 
Unconstitutional Actions Hurt the 99%, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1085, 1093 (2012). 
 33 Id. at 1098–99. 
 34 Id. at 1109–10 (referring to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010). 
 35 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its 
Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 905–06 (2009) (“Congress may, in the 
exercise of its assigned powers, delegate whatever discretion it likes, pursuant to 
whatever strict or lax standards it chooses, to administrative agencies within the 
executive branch. So long as Congress retains the authority to undo the delegation, 
delegation is a form of exercise of its legislative power, not a relinquishment of it.”). 
 36 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 47 (1999). 
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as part of the Bill of Rights, as is discussed in Part A which 
follows. A second option is that the Framers, by vesting the 
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers in separate branches, 
could have trusted that the separation of powers, along with 
other defensive tools, would cause and allow each branch to 
zealously guard its own powers and delegate them only when 
they could limit and control the delegation, and when the 
delegation furthered the branch’s purpose. Madison described the 
separation of powers and associated defensive means as “the 
great security against a gradual concentration of the several 
powers in the same department,” as the ambition of each 
department would prevent it from giving too much of its power to 
another branch.37 A third option is that the Framers could have 
intended, in addition to or as a result of the separation of powers, 
that an implicit nondelegation doctrine exist somehow in the 
fabric or penumbra of the Constitution even though they did not 
publicly discuss this during the drafting or ratification of the 
Constitution and rejected it for the text. There were no doubt 
other options, but this last one seems highly unlikely. If the 
Framers thought that the nondelegation doctrine were at all 
important, they likely would have included it in the 
Constitution’s text, not leave it as a doctrine written in air. And 
this option is also the least effective, given the long dormancy of 
the nondelegation doctrine and the ongoing debate about 
whether it even exists as a constitutional mandate. 
Seen in this light, originalists’ efforts to create a new, more 
stringent nondelegation doctrine would not return the 
Constitution to its original meaning but rather would force into 
the Constitution terms that were rejected at the Founding. 
Originalists would have the Supreme Court amend the 
Constitution to include the terms and principles the Framers and 
First Congress rejected. Worse yet, a robust nondelegation 
doctrine would undermine the separation of powers as set by the 
Constitution, as the Court would be giving itself an ill-defined, 
uncontrollable license to overturn even long-standing regulatory 
legislation with which a majority of the Court disagrees. A robust 
nondelegation doctrine would empower the Court to overturn 
major policy decisions by Congress, both current and decades old, 
regarding the scope and method of environment protection, 
health care and insurance regulation, financial services 
regulation, and a myriad of other policy choices that should be 
left to Congress. 
 
 37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 268 (James Madison). 
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A. Madison, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and the Separation of 
Powers in the Constitution 
The nondelegation doctrine is found nowhere in the 
Constitution.38 However, Madison was involved in two attempts 
to insert into the Constitution clauses intended to prevent one 
branch of government from using the powers of another branch. 
Madison also was a proponent of adding to the Constitution a 
Council of Revision, which would have blended the separate 
powers and enabled a council made up of the President and 
members of the federal judiciary to review every act of Congress 
and give the Council of Revision a tool to revise legislation and a 
qualified veto of Congressional legislation on policy as well as 
constitutional grounds.39  
Early during the Constitutional Convention while considering 
a very weak executive power, Madison’s notes indicate the 
proposal to fix the powers of the Executive to be “with power to 
carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not 
otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers ‘not 
Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature,’ as may from time to time 
be delegated by the national Legislature.”40 In other words, 
Congress could delegate non-legislative powers to the Executive, 
but not legislative powers. The words “not legislative nor judiciary 
in their nature” were added to this proposed amendment, Madison 
indicated, “in consequence of a suggestion by Genl. Pinkney that 
improper powers might otherwise be delegated.”41 
However, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney’s second 
cousin, Charles Pinckney, moved that the limitation on 
delegation be stricken, saying “they were unnecessary, the object 
of them being included in the ‘power to carry into effect the 
national laws.’” Madison’s notes indicate that he “did not know 
that the words were absolutely necessary. . . He did not however 
see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might 
happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and 
misconstructions.”42 Madison’s notes indicate his own thoughts 
and how he equivocated about the necessity of including in the 
Constitution an express nondelegation clause. This is hardly a 
 
 38 Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 
89 (2010) (“The Constitution's text is of little help, for it says nothing explicit about 
delegating the power Article I confers.”). 
 39 See BERGER, supra note 6, at 300–11. 
 40 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 65 (Max Farrand ed., Yale 
Univ. Press 1911) (emphasis added). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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stirring endorsement of a nondelegation doctrine or strong 
evidence that Madison thought the doctrine definitely should be 
included explicitly in the Constitution.  
Charles Pinckney’s motion to strike was based on the 
argument that the object of the added words was already 
included, though what exactly that means is not entirely clear. It 
could mean that the purpose of a bar on nondelegation was 
already achieved through other means or that the Executive 
power somehow already carried a limitation on using delegated 
legislative power in it, depending what the “object” is.43 At this 
point, the drafters were undecided on what form the Executive 
should take, unitary or plural,44 and the drafters were focused on 
defining the reach of Executive power.45 This bar on delegation 
may have stricken as redundant because at that point in the 
Constitution’s drafting, the powers of the Executive were much 
more sharply limited than they later would be in the final 
Constitution and “were confined to appointment and 
execution. . .”46 When the Executive powers were broadened, 
however, no express nondelegation clause was inserted. The 
nondelegation provision may have been defeated because it was 
viewed as unnecessary, which to Posner and Vermeule “suggests, 
if anything, that legislative delegation to the executive was 
viewed as unproblematic.”47  
Madison was also a proponent of a proposal at the 
Constitutional Convention that would have blended the powers of 
the Executive and Judicial branches with that of the Legislative 
by establishing a Council of Revision, a body of the Executive and 
“a convenient number of the National Judiciary” to weigh in on 
laws as they were drafted to help Congress make better laws by 
participating in their revision, and with a power of veto qualified 
by the fact that it could be overridden by the legislature.48 The 
 
 43 Id.; see also Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 718, 743 (2019) 
(observing that Charles Pinckney, who moved to strike the phrase, and Edmund 
Randolph, who seconded the motion, both “felt that this limitation was inherent in the 
executive's power to ‘carry into effect’ the laws . . . .”). 
 44 For example, Governor Edmund Randolph argued that a unitary executive is “the 
foetus of monarchy.” See Michael W. McConnell, James Wilson's Contributions to the 
Construction of Article II, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 32–33 (2019). 
 45 Id. at 46 (“In this connection, it is suggestive that Madison . . . (and C.C. 
Pinckney) sought to limit executive power by denying to the President powers ‘not 
legislative nor judiciary in their nature’ . . . .”). 
 46 Id. at 36 (“The result was a mere shadow of the ‘energetic’ and powerful executive 
that Wilson and Rutledge evidently had in mind, which would eventually emerge from the 
Convention.”). 
 47 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1734. 
 48 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 21. 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 12:57 PM 
720 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:3 
Executive and the judges making up the Council of Revision 
would thus have both the negative legislative power of a qualified 
veto and also the positive legislative power to review laws and 
assert their opinions and suggestions for revision, opinions given 
weight by the threat of veto.  
James Wilson supported the Council of Revision, saying that 
“Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be 
destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the 
Judges in refusing to give them effect.”49 Wilson urged that the 
council have “a share in the Revisionary power” so that “they will 
have an opportunity of taking notice of these character[istics] of a 
law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the 
improper views of the Legislature.”50 The Council of Revision 
would have allowed judges and the Executive to weigh in during 
the legislative drafting and revising process on whether laws 
were good policy and with their suggestions for improvement, 
even if the proposed laws were constitutional.51 Thus, the Council 
of Revision would have given the Executive and the judicial 
members both qualified negative legislative power but also some 
positive legislative power during the drafting and revision 
process.52 “According to Madison, good lawmaking required the 
input of judicial minds at the outset.”53 Madison noted that some 
might object that the Council of Revision might “give too much 
strength either to the Executive or Judiciary” or would constitute 
a violation of the separation of powers as “a union of the Judiciary & 
Executive branches in the revision of the laws. . .”54 but was not 
concerned about the other branches gaining such legislative 
power. “Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful 
tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. 
This was the real source of danger to the American 
Constitutions. . .”55 Madison’s great concern was not the risk of 
excessive legislative delegation by Congress but rather the 
likelihood of excessive encroachment by Congress on an 
Executive and a Judiciary unable to protect themselves. He 
defended the Council of Revision against the charge it would 
 
 49 Id. at 73. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. For this point, see also James T. Barry III, The Council of Revision and the 
Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 250–51 (1989). 
 52 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 73. 
 53 Barry III, supra note 51, at 250. 
 54 Revisionary Power of the Executive and the Judiciary, [21 July] 1787, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-
0067 [http://perma.cc/SL2W-TSTK] (citing 10 James Madison, The Papers of James 
Madison 109–110 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)). 
 55 Id. 
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breach the separation of powers by arguing that giving the 
Executive and the judiciary this power over Congress would be 
“an auxiliary precaution in favor of” the separation of powers.56 
Far from denouncing this delegation of legislative power as an 
assault on the separation of powers, Madison argued it would 
help preserve that separation.  
Madison’s notes show he meant this delegation of legislative 
power to give the Executive and the judiciary policy-making 
power and to protect the rights of the public: “In short, whether 
the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the 
Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate 
Departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from 
passing laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form, 
the utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to 
the Executive seemed incontestable.”57 Some originalists claim 
that Congress delegating legislative power could oppress the 
public. Madison stated that the Constitution in fact should 
delegate some legislative power, primarily negative but also a 
positive revisionary power, to the other branches to prevent 
Congress from encroaching on the rights of the people at large. 
Suppressing legislative delegation seems in direct contradiction 
to Madison’s proposal and in opposition to Madison’s fears that a 
too-powerful Congress would encroach on the rights of the people. 
Madison went further in arguing for the delegation of 
legislative power to the executive and judicial branches in his 
1788 observations on Jefferson’s draft for Virginia’s 
constitution.58 There, Madison suggested that the executive and 
judicial branches be given a revisionary power meant as a “check 
to precipitate, to unjust, and to unconstitutional laws” that might 
be passed by the legislature.59 Madison proposed that all bills be 
transmitted by the legislature to the executive and judicial 
branches and that: “If either of these object, let ⅔, if both ¾ of 
each House be necessary to overrule the objection. . .”60  
If either the executive or judicial branch objects that the bill 
is unconstitutional, Madison’s proposal would have required that 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 Revisionary Power of the Executive and the Judiciary, [6 June] 1787, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-
0022 [http://perma.cc/6GF4-BQPR] (citing 10 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 35–36 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)). 
 58 James Madison, Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (1788), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch17s25.html 
[http://perma.cc/UE2E-7EJB]. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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the bill be suspended until the next election and a repassage of 
the bill “by ⅔ or ¾ of both Houses, as the case may be” and that 
upon such override, neither the judiciary or the executive could 
pronounce it unconstitutional.61 Madison was urging even 
greater delegation of legislative power, in that the judicial and 
executive branches each had the power to veto legislation, and 
that even if the legislature had the votes to overrule such veto, if 
the objection by either the Executive or the judiciary were that 
the bill was unconstitutional, no override was possible and any 
repassage of the bill would have to wait until after the next 
election, when new legislators might be seated and would 
reconsider.  
This great power over the legislature by the judicial and 
executive branches would constitute a stunning breach of the 
separation of powers. And Madison’s odd twist that the 
legislature could repass the bill in a way that made it 
impregnable from constitutional challenge would allow the 
legislature to usurp the courts’ power to determine the 
constitutionality of such legislation. Madison had idiosyncratic 
ideas of how to defend the separation of powers and ones that 
might astonish those who would consider his intentions as a 
binding guide to how our government should function. If 
originalist Justices want to import Madison’s ideas into the 
Constitution, perhaps they should start with the idea that 
Congress can pass legislation in a way that makes it impregnable 
from the Court’s constitutional review. That would certainly 
shake up the separation of powers. 
Opponents to the Council of Revision complained that judges 
should not be legislators, interfere in legislative business, or 
meddle in politics.62 The Convention voted twice on the proposal 
for a Council of Revision, and it was twice voted down.63  
Madison was involved in another attempt to insert 
something akin to the nondelegation doctrine into the 
Constitution through an amendment explicitly stating that no 
branch of the national government could exercise powers 
delegated by the Constitution to another department. Madison 
initially proposed this as an amendment to the text of the 
Constitution.64 When Madison’s proposed textual amendments 
 
 61 Id. 
 62 See BERGER, supra note 6, at 302. 
 63 Barry III, supra note 51, at 257. 
 64 BERKIN, supra note 7, at 152. Madison’s proposed amendments stated, “Eighthly. 
That immediately after article 6th, be inserted, as article 7th, the clauses following, to 
wit: The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the departments to 
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were transformed into a proposed bill of rights to be appended to 
the Constitution, it included as a Sixteenth Amendment: 
The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the 
departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the 
legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the 
executive or judicial nor the executive exercise the powers vested in 
the legislative or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested 
in the legislative or executive departments.65  
Wurman refers to this as the “Nondelegation Amendment.”66 This 
is not a nondelegation amendment, but rather a non-encroachment 
amendment, in that it does not forbid delegation explicitly, but only 
prevents each branch from exercising and hence encroaching on 
powers vested in another branch. How significant that difference is of 
course is open to dispute. Madison’s non-encroachment amendment 
seems part of Madison’s continuing effort to prevent Congress from 
usurping the powers of the other branches, rather than an attempt to 
prevent legislative delegation, especially given Madison’s failed effort 
to create a Council of Revision that would have delegated some 
legislative power to the other branches in order to prevent Congress 
from encroaching on executive or judicial turf. 
Representative Sherman objected to Madison’s non-encroachment 
amendment as “altogether unnecessary, inasmuch as the Constitution 
assigned the business of each branch of the Government to a separate 
department.”67 Sherman’s objection could well indicate that he thought 
a ban on encroachment was unnecessary, as the branches would use 
the constitutional means at their disposal to guard their powers out of 
self-interest, which Madison stated in Federalist 51 was the “great 
security” against the concentration of powers in one branch, as will be 
discussed.68 
Madison agreed with Sherman’s objection, possibly in 
recognition of the “great security” provided by each branch’s 
jealous protections of their powers combined with their 
constitutional means of defense, but also “supposed the people 
would be gratified with the amendment, as it was admitted that 
the powers ought to be separate and distinct; it might also tend 
to an explanation of some doubts that might arise respecting the 
 
which they are respectively distributed: so that the Legislative Department shall never 
exercise the powers vested in the Executive or Judicial, nor the Executive exercise the 
powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial, nor the Judicial exercise the powers vested in 
the Legislative or Executive Departments.” Id. 
 65 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (1789) (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834). 
 66 Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 15, 16–17 (2020). 
 67 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 65, at 760. 
 68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 268 (James Madison).  
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construction of the Constitution.”69 Madison seemed to indicate 
he thought that his amendment would add something to the 
Constitution, but exactly what is not clear. Another 
representative condemned the amendment as “subversive of the 
Constitution,” which seems to indicate the idea that an express 
non-encroachment clause would cause significant damage to the 
structure of the Constitution.70 While the non-encroachment 
amendment passed the House of Representatives, it was struck 
in the Senate,71 the records of which give no indication of reasons 
for editing or rejecting any of the proposed amendments.72 
Some originalists argue that these failed attempts to include 
the nondelegation doctrine or a non-encroachment clause in the 
Constitution indicate somehow that it is already there.73. Ilan 
Wurman argued that Madison included the nondelegation 
doctrine to be “doubly sure.”74 Clearly, Madison and at least a few 
others thought at various times that either a nondelegation or a 
non-encroachment doctrine should be included in the 
Constitution and were concerned that the some might think that 
the separation of powers would not be sufficient to prevent 
delegation of legislative powers. However, the Senate rejecting 
the non-encroachment doctrine is evidence that the 
nondelegation doctrine did not make it into the Constitution, not 
proof that it was already there. If the Court were now to read 
into the Constitution a strict nondelegation doctrine, it would in 
essence be amending the Constitution to include terms similar to 
the proposed amendment to the Constitution rejected during its 
drafting or to some extent akin to Madison’s proposed Sixteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution rejected by the Senate. 
Madison wrestled with how to prevent the legislative branch 
from encroaching on the Executive and Judicial Branches, at 
times advocating a nondelegation or non-encroachment doctrines 
to be included in the Constitution, at times supporting a proposal 
to allow the Executive and Judicial Branch to be empowered to 
participate in legislative power, at other times arguing the 
 
 69 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 65, at 453. 
 70 Id. at 760–61 (statement of Representative Livermore). 
 71 Wurman, supra note 66, at 17. 
 72 ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER 162 (1997) (“The stark 
reportage of the Senate Journal provides not the slightest clue to the Senate’s reasons for 
these deletions. . .” including striking the sixteenth article on nondelegation.). 
 73 Wurman, supra note 66, at 16–17. See also Gordon, supra note 43, at 743–44. 
 74 Wurman, supra note 66, at 16 (“Here are two prominent representatives, both key 
players in the Constitutional Convention, arguing that a nondelegation amendment was 
unnecessary. Madison further argued that it was better to be doubly sure and make the 
principle explicit.”). 
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ineffectiveness of such a rigid, express separation of powers and 
defending its absence in the Constitution, and at least once 
indicating that he thought some limits on delegation were 
included in the Constitution. Madison discussed delegation 
extensively in the Federalist Papers arguing for the ratification 
of the Constitution. In Federalist 47, Madison addressed the 
criticism that the Constitution did not sufficiently separate the 
powers of government, which he called “[o]ne of the principal 
objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the 
Constitution. . .”75 Madison noted the importance of the 
separation of powers, stating that the “accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.”76  
To address these concerns about the separation of powers, 
Madison said “The oracle who is always consulted and cited on 
this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. . . [who] has the 
merit . . . of displaying and recommending it most effectually to 
the attention of mankind”77 Madison failed even to mention 
Locke, however, showing Locke’s striking unimportance. 
Montesquieu, Madison asserted, “appears to have viewed the 
Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own 
expression, as the mirror of political liberty” and so Madison 
examined the British system of separation of powers, to 
determine whether the Constitution fell short. Madison noted 
that the powers were not strictly separated under the 
Constitution of England, and that part of the legislative branch 
acts as a “great constitutional council to the executive chief” and 
is “invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction.”78  
From such examples, Madison concluded that Montesquieu 
did not advocate a strict separation of powers, and that “it may 
clearly be inferred that, in saying ‘There can be no liberty where 
the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person, or body of magistrates,’ . . . [Montesquieu] did not mean 
that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, 
or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other.”79 Madison seems to 
be asserting that under Montesquieu’s principles, Congress 
could, without undue risk, make the Executive Branch 
Congress’s agent, with Congressional control. Some of the 
 
 75 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 249–55 (James Madison). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
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defenders of the nondelegation doctrine claim that the original 
meaning of the Constitution mandates that Congress, as the 
agent of the people, cannot delegate its powers to the Executive 
Branch as its sub-agent,80 but Madison’s words seem to refute 
that.  
Madison states what he takes to be Montesquieu’s asserted 
limits on delegation: “[Montesquieu’s] meaning, as his own words 
import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example 
in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the 
WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands 
which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the 
fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.”81 
The improper delegation then was that of the whole legislative 
power, not a limited and directed delegation. Madison gave as an 
example of excessive concentration of powers in one branch “if 
the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also 
the complete legislative power. . .” and thus read Montesquieu as 
not advocating a complete separation of powers, “but rather in 
favor of a modified, incomplete, separation of governmental 
powers.”82  
Madison noted that some states had express separation of 
powers clauses in their state constitutions preventing each 
branch from encroaching on the powers of the other branches, 
but those did not effectively prevent the admixture of powers 
among the branches. Madison specifically addresses the 
Massachusetts state constitution, which stated: “that the 
legislative department shall never exercise the executive and 
judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never 
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the 
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, 
or either of them.’’83 Madison indicates that such a declaration 
“goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire 
departments from exercising the powers of another department. 
In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture 
of powers has been admitted.”84 Madison then notes the failure of 
such express language in state constitutions to prevent the 
admixture of powers. “If we look into the constitutions of the 
several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical 
 
 80 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 251 (James Madison) (emphasis in original). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu's Theory of Government and the Framing of 
the American Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 34 (1990). 
 83 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 , supra note 1, at 254 (James Madison). 
 84 Id. 
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and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this 
axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which 
the several departments of power have been kept absolutely 
separate and distinct.” and “in no instance has a competent 
provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation 
delineated on paper.”85 In defending the Constitution’s lack of 
express lines drawn between the branches from critics 
complaining about that absence, Madison points out how even 
state constitutions that had express bars on branches using other 
branches’ powers did not achieve a full separation of powers.  
Madison returned to this subject in Federalist 48, stating 
that what is impermissible is when one branch’s power is 
“directly and completely administered by either of the other 
departments. . .” and that the legislature is the great danger, 
given that any “projects of usurpation by [the other branches] 
would immediately betray and defeat themselves.”86 Congress 
delegating specific legislative powers under its direction and 
control clearly would not constitute its legislative power being 
“directly and completely administered” by federal agencies, and 
so appears to receive Madison’s blessing. Madison also asserted 
that appeals to the populace would not effectively prevent the 
accumulation of power in one branch of government.87  
After determining that neither an express constitutional 
prohibition on branches using other branches’ powers nor an 
appeal to the people was sufficient to prevent encroachment by 
one branch on the other, Madison, in Federalist 51, asserts that 
only one method would be effective, a structure of government 
with a separation of powers, so that “each department should 
have a will of its own” and that each branch will keep the others 
“in their proper places.”88 Madison concluded that the “great 
security” against the accumulation of powers in one branch is 
neither an express bar on branches using other branches’ powers 
nor an appeal to the people, but rather, “giving to those who 
administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”89 
Once that structure is put in place, the people running each 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 1 (James Madison). 
 87 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 1, at 257 (James Madison). 
 88 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 267 (James Madison) (“The only answer 
that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the 
defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that 
its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each 
other in their proper places.”). 
 89 Id. 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 12:57 PM 
728 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:3 
branch would be driven to jealously protect their powers by their 
own ambition. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. 
The interest of the man must be connected with the 
constitutional rights of the place.”90 In other words, the object of 
a nondelegation or non-encroachment doctrine, to prevent the 
accumulation of powers in one branch, is better accomplished 
simply by the separation of powers and giving each branch 
constitutional tools to resist encroachment, because the ambition 
of the people in each branch will prevent the accumulation of 
powers in any branch. By comparison, the nondelegation doctrine 
would give the Court an offensive tool against both Congress and 
the Executive, and allow the Court to interfere in the cooperation 
between the two other branches. The power to delegate gives 
Congress a defensive tool against the Executive Branch, in that 
Congress can dictate to federal agencies and assign them tasks, 
including rule-making. The nondelegation doctrine would strip 
this defensive power from Congress. After Congress passes a law 
and the President does not veto it, why should the Court 
interfere in how they cooperate? The nondelegation doctrine is 
not a defensive tool for the Court, as its judicial powers are not 
threatened by congressional delegation to the Executive Branch. 
Instead, the nondelegation doctrine would simply an offensive 
weapon for the Court improperly to seize power from both 
Congress and the Executive Branch. 
Madison spoke again about delegation as a Virginia 
Representative during the Post Roads Debate during the Second 
Congress, in which members discussed whether they should set 
the locations of post roads and post offices, a power vested in 
them by the Constitution, or should delegate that task to the 
President, as one motion proposed.91 The motion to delegate 
failed, as the members debated whether the House had the duty 
to set the locations of post roads and post offices, given that the 
Constitution assigned the House that task and power.92 Madison 
argued against the amendment, stating that “there did not 
appear to be any necessity for alienating the powers of the 
House; and that if this should take place, it would be a violation 
 
 90 Id. 
 91 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 90 NW. U. L. 
REV. 606, 629 (1996) (“Representative Sedgwick moved to replace the detailed 
specification of routes in the House bill with a direction that the mail should be carried 
between Wiscasset, in the district of Maine, to Savannah, Georgia, ‘by such route as the 
President of the United States shall, from time to time, cause to be established.’” (citing 3 
ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791) (Gales & Seaton eds., 1849)). 
 92 Id. at 628–32. 
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of the Constitution.”93 From this, Christine Kexel Chabot argued 
that Madison may have had necessity in mind as a necessary 
justification for delegation.94 However, she also noted that not 
everyone agreed with Madison’s “‘necessity’ test” for delegation.95 
Madison may have been commenting that by delegating that 
power to the President, the House would lose it permanently, 
because once the post roads and post offices, or any significant 
number of them, were built, it would be impracticable for 
Congress to undo the presidential plan. However, even despite 
this objection, the House did eventually delegate to the President 
the discretion to establish other roads as post roads.96 and 
delegated to the Postmaster General the power to determine 
where the post offices should be.97 As Mortenson and Bagley 
note, “Far from demonstrating the force of Madison’s 
constitutional objection, the statute as enacted expressly 
conferred the open-ended authority that Madison had claimed 
was unconstitutional during debate.”98 David Currie, after noting 
extensive delegation to the Executive Branch regarding the 
postal issues, indicated that a constitutional objection to 
delegation may not have been the driving element in this debate, 
stating, “Despite all the crocodile tears, one is tempted to 
attribute the House’s zest for detail more to a taste for pork than 
to a principled concern for the virtues of representative 
government.”99 
When deciding how to repay the enormous national debt, much 
of which was incurred to fund the Revolutionary War,100 Congress 
debated whether it could delegate its borrowing power provided 
under Article I, Section 8. Chabot stated, “It is no surprise that 
Madison referred to the borrowing law as a delegation of ‘great 
trust’ that left key terms of loans and ‘execution of one of the most 
important laws’ to the President.”101 Though one might imagine 
that discussion of delegation would have “consume[d] the entire 
debate” in the House of Representatives, this did not happen.102 
 
 93 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 239 (1791) (Gales & Seaton eds., 1849). 
 94 Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation at the Founding, GA. L. 
REV. (manuscript at 43) (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3654564. 
 95 Id. (manuscript at 41–42). 
 96 Id. (manuscript at 42). 
 97 Id. (manuscript at 43). 
 98 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 353. 
 99 Currie, supra note 91, at 631. 
 100 Chabot, supra note 94 (manuscript at 20). 
 101 Id. (manuscript at 4) (quoting LLOYD’S NOTES FROM MAY 19, 1790, reprinted in 
DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SECOND SESSION: APRIL-AUGUST 1790, at 
1349). 
 102 Id. (manuscript at 21). 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 12:57 PM 
730 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:3 
Instead, debate focused more on which member of the Executive 
Branch should be delegated such borrowing power, with Madison 
asserting that it should be the President.103 Instead of rejecting 
congressional delegation, House members responded to the 
constitutional concerns by supporting delegation “with some 
limitation on the amount to be borrowed.”104  
Another important example of delegation by Congress in its 
first years was the Alien Friends Act of 1798,105 which authorized 
the President to order aliens as he deemed dangerous to depart 
the country. During the debates, the constitutionality of the act 
was debated, not regarding delegation, but instead about which 
of the enumerated powers of Congress justified the legislation.106 
Throughout the debates, only two members “voiced anything that 
bore a resemblance to a nondelegation argument.”107 Those 
arguments failed and the legislation was passed.108 Wurman 
notes that during the debate, no one argued that Congress could 
freely delegate—an argument Wurman claims “they surely would 
have been motivated to make if it were true.”109 That claim seems 
off, since it is easy to see why only two nondelegation arguments 
in the course of the debates would generate no pro-delegation 
responses. Even so, Wurman admits, “It is certainly possible to 
infer that the nondelegation principle itself was rejected, but 
there is no way to know that with any degree of confidence.”110 
In his Virginia Report of 1800, Madison, by then a member of 
the Virginia legislature,111 returned to the topic of the Alien 
Friends Act and its delegation of legislative power by Congress. 
Madison noted, “Details, to a certain degree, are essential to the 
nature and character of a law; and, on criminal subjects, it is 
proper, that details should leave as little as possible to the 
discretion of those who are to apply and to execute the law.”112 
Congress should, he asserted, not grant “a general conveyance of 
 
 103 Id. (citing LLOYD’S NOTES FROM MAY 19, 1790, reprinted in DEBATES IN THE HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES, SECOND SESSION: APRIL-AUGUST 1790, at 1354). 
 104 Id.  
 105 An Act Concerning Aliens, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798). 
 106 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 365. 
 107 Id. at 366. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Wurman, supra note 66, at 25. 
 110 Id. at 26. 
 111 H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. 
L. REV. 949, 962 n.72 (1993). 
 112 The Report of 1800 [7 January 1800], FOUNDERS ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0202 [http://perma.cc/5H5L-
CWBY] (citing 17 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 303–51 (David B. 
Mattern et al. eds., 1991)). 
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authority, without laying down any precise rules, by which the 
authority conveyed, should be carried into effect. . .” because 
otherwise “the whole power of legislation might be transferred by 
the legislature from itself, and proclamations might become 
substitutes for laws.”113 
Madison stated the test of whether a law constitutes a 
proper delegation and hence constitutional is “whether it 
contains such details, definitions, and rules, as appertain to the 
true character of a law; especially, a law by which personal 
liberty is invaded, property deprived of its value to the owner, 
and life itself indirectly exposed to danger.” And so, the question 
is whether the law contains enough “details, definitions, and 
rules” to appear to be a real law, and not just a handing off of the 
legislative power to another branch. 
These statements by Madison are notable in that they 
include the claim that excessive delegation is unconstitutional. If 
Madison’s intent as of 1800 alone were to determine the meaning 
of the Constitution, then the nondelegation doctrine would be the 
constitutional mandate that Congress can delegate only where it 
has drafted a law with enough “details, definitions, and rules” to 
appear to be a real law, which is a far cry from the claim that 
Congress cannot delegate its legislative powers. Such a doctrine 
would have the same hazards as the current intelligibility rule, 
as it would not guide the courts in determining how much detail 
is sufficient, however. And the post-Ratification interpretation of 
one of the Framers, whose views on this subject varied over the 
years, should not determine the meaning of the Constitution. 
B. The Vesting Clauses, Separation of Powers, and Silence as 
the Sources of the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Given the absence of the nondelegation doctrine in the 
Constitution, those asserting its importance have struggled to 
determine its original basis. Any constitutional limitation of 
delegation would have to be implicit, but proving an implicit 
limitation on delegation would be a challenge “because 
constitutional interpreters are properly reluctant to find implicit 
restrictions on express textual grants” of congressional legislative 
power, given that the detailed express restrictions in Article I, 
Section 9 suggest “by negative implication that no other 
limitations should be recognized.”114  
 
 113 Id. 
 114 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1729. 
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Those who seek a nondelegation doctrine with teeth search 
for any constitutional basis for it, despite its absence in the 
Constitution’s text. Some claim that nondelegation is a necessary 
corollary to Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, 
which provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”115 However, Article 
I does not specify what Congress can do with the legislative 
power vested in it or whether it can delegate those powers. While 
Article II vests Executive power in the President, few question 
the President’s authority to delegate to federal agencies.116 
Phillip Hamburger has argued strenuously that restrictions 
on legislative delegation spring directly from the Vesting 
Clauses, and that because the Constitution vests all legislative 
power in Congress, Congress cannot delegate any of that 
power.117 Hamburger asserts therefore that the nondelegation 
doctrine should be “put aside—not on the grounds offered by 
Professors Mortenson and Bagley, but because the Constitution 
speaks instead in stronger terms about vesting.”118 In his 2014 
book, Hamburger gives a fuller argument, relying heavily on the 
word “all” in the legislative vesting clause. In contrast to the 
judicial and executive clauses, which omit the word “all,” 
Hamburger states that “when granting legislative power, the 
Constitution speaks of all legislative powers.”119 The President 
can “delegate some executive power to his subordinates,” 
Hamburger argues, because the Constitution does not vest all 
legislative power to the President, but “Congress cannot delegate 
any of its legislative powers, for they all rest in Congress.”120  
Hamburger’s vesting argument is an influential one, since, 
as he notes, Justice Gorsuch employed a vesting argument in 
Gundy v. United States, and also cites to Hamburger’s work on 
nondelegation in his dissent.121 Few would claim that Congress 
cannot leave even the slightest detail to federal agencies to fill in. 
 
 115 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 116 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America.”). 
 117 Philip Hamburger, Delegating or Divesting?, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 88, 110 (2020) 
(“First, because the Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, Congress cannot 
vest any such powers elsewhere. Second, Congress cannot divest itself of the powers that 
the Constitution vests in it.”). Hamburger notes, however, that a “full exposition of these 
points must await another publication. Id. 
 118 Id. at 88 (italics in original). 
 119 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 387 (2014). 
 120 Id. 
 121 See 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135, 2140 n.62 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Accepting, 
then, that we have an obligation to decide whether Congress has unconstitutionally 
divested itself of its legislative responsibilities, the question follows: What's the test?”). 
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However, Congress can legislate with incredible detail and, in 
the early days of the Republic, frequently did.122 Hamburger’s 
argument would mandate that because Congress can legislate 
with great detail, only it can specify such details, which would 
turn legislative acts into unworkable monstrosities. Such a bar 
would rob Congress of the power to employ the discretion and 
flexibility of federal agencies when Congress thought it necessary 
or desirable and would make government far less efficient.  
Those asserting that the nondelegation doctrine can be found 
in the Vesting Clauses, however, should wrestle with the original 
meaning of the word “vest” in the Constitution and whether 
vesting legislative powers in Congress precludes or limits 
delegating those powers. Richard Epstein is rare among 
originalists discussing nondelegation in attempting to tease out 
the original meaning of the word “vest” in the Vesting Clauses, 
and his discussion shows the difficulty in finding a delegation bar 
in Article I’s vesting of all legislative power in Congress. Epstein 
states, “The use of the term ‘vested’ brings back images of vested 
rights in the law of property; that is, rights that are fully clothed 
and protected, which means, at the very least, that they cannot 
be undone by ordinary legislative action. . .”123 From this, Epstein 
derives the conclusion that legislative power cannot be delegated 
to an agency or other branch of government or otherwise.124  
A property analogy for the Vesting Clauses weighs against 
the existence of a nondelegation doctrine, however, since some 
property interests may at times become transferable and sold 
only when they become vested and not before. For example, 
interests in a will may become transferable when they are 
vested, though they may not be when merely contingent.125 If the 
vesting of legislative power may be analogized to the vesting of 
property rights, it seems that, while Congress should not be able 
 
 122 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1292 (2006) (“Early Congresses also 
micromanaged administration . . . in excruciating detail. The 1791 statute . . . laying taxes 
on distilled spirits, occupies fifteen pages in the Statutes at Large and specifies everything 
from the brand of hydrometer to be used in testing proof, to the exact lettering to be used 
on casks that have been inspected, to the wording of signs to be used to identify revenue 
offices.”). 
 123 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE DUBIOUS MORALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 36 (2020).  
 124 Id. 
 125 See Real Property—Vested Remainders—Validity of Assignment, 30 YALE L.J. 100, 
100 (1920) (discussing that in deciding whether a property interest in an estate may be 
transferred, “the court avoided the necessity of determining the transferability of 
contingent remainders and followed the well-settled rule, to which judicial history of that 
very jurisdiction has long contributed, that vested remainders are fully transmissible as 
other species of property” (citing In Re Whitney’s Estate, 176 Cal. 12 (1917))).  
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to transfer its legislative powers wholesale, it should be free to 
delegate their use to the Executive Branch, like a property owner 
vested with title may lend the use of that property to another.  
Another common claim for the source of the nondelegation 
doctrine is that it stems from the separation of powers, itself also 
not directly stated in the Constitution.126 However, the 
separation of powers by itself would seem to justify some 
legislative delegation, not forbid it. As Justice Scalia noted in 
Mistretta v. United States, absolute separation of power is 
impossible, and “a certain degree of discretion, and thus of 
lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action,” and 
therefore it is up to Congress “to determine-up to a point-how 
small or how large that degree shall be.”127 
Gary Lawson argues that the absence in the Constitution of 
text allowing delegation shows that delegation of legislative 
power is forbidden. To Lawson, the correct question is, “Does any 
clause of the Constitution expressly or implicitly permit the 
delegation of legislative authority?”128 Because the Constitution 
creates a “government of limited and enumerated powers,” 
Lawson states that any claim that a branch of that government 
can do something must be based on an enumerated power to do 
so. While legislative power is vested in Congress, his argument 
goes: Congress can do nothing with that power not explicitly 
permitted elsewhere in the Constitution, and because delegation 
is not mentioned, it is barred.129 This argument, however, seems 
to fly in the face of Article I, Section 9’s list of specific powers 
denied Congress. If Congress has only those powers expressly 
granted to it, there would be no need for a list of powers denied 
Congress. From the division of power in the Vesting Clauses, 
Lawson asserts there must be a baseline, a line past which the 
various branches cannot otherwise intrude into powers granted 
other branches. “The Vesting Clauses, and indeed the entire 
structure of the Constitution, make no sense otherwise.”130 To 
buttress this argument, Lawson cites to Madison and the 
 
 126 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“The nondelegation 
doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite 
system of Government . . .” (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892))).  
 127 Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 128 See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 337 (2002). 
 129 Id. Douglas Ginsburg made a similar argument, asserting “Nor can the Congress 
confer such a lawmaking power by statute, for the simple reason that the Congress has no 
enumerated power to create lawmakers.” Douglas Ginsburg, Legislative Powers: Not 
Yours to Give Away, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/the-
constitution/report/legislative-powers-not-yours-give-away [http://perma.cc/5VCE-TPFR]. 
 130 Lawson, supra note 128, at 340. 
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Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, but acknowledges in a 
footnote that the historical sources are not conclusive evidence.131 
C. Locke as the Source for the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Defenders of the nondelegation doctrine often credit John 
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government as one of the primary 
sources for the that doctrine.132 In his Second Treatise of 
Government, Locke stated as a constraint on legislative power 
that it, being derived from “the People by a positive voluntary 
Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what that positive 
Grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to 
make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to transfer 
their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands.”133  
Some originalist scholars and judges treat Locke’s statement 
as if it were incorporated implicitly into the Constitution. Aaron 
Gordon stated, “Locke’s ideas profoundly influenced the 
development of America’s Constitution, and there is substantial 
evidence that his disapproval of legislative delegation in 
particular was incorporated into our founding document . . .”134 
Ilan Wurman boldly states, “The nondelegation principle can be 
traced to John Locke’s Second Treatise, which was deeply 
influential on the Founding generation.”135 Justice Gorsuch’s 
Gundy dissent echoed that claim, stating without any citation of 
authority and, given the historical record, in all likelihood 
erroneously that Locke was “one of the thinkers who most 
influenced the Framers’ understanding of the separation of 
powers.”136 Justice Rehnquist cited Locke for the proposition that 
“the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of 
making laws and place it in other hands.”137 Justice Thomas cited 
Locke for the same proposition, and contended that Locke’s and 
others’ writing “about the relationship between private rights 
 
 131 Id. at 341 n.51. 
 132 Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's 
Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1311 (2003). 
 133 LOCKE, supra note 5, at 363 (emphasis omitted). 
 134 Gordon, supra note 43, at 739. 
 135 Wurman, supra note 66, at 29. 
 136 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 137 Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672–73 (1980) (“In his 
Second Treatise of Civil Government, published in 1690, John Locke wrote that ‘[t]he 
power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and 
institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to 
make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their 
authority of making laws and place it in other hands.’”). 
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and governmental power profoundly influenced the men who 
crafted, debated, and ratified the Constitution.”138 
The supposed influence of Locke’s Second Treatise over the 
drafters of the Constitution is thus central to originalists’ claim 
that the Constitution contains an implicit nondelegation 
doctrine. Thomas Merrill noted, “The premise here is that the 
Framers were familiar with and largely approved of Locke’s 
political philosophy. So if Locke supported the legislative 
monopoly position, the Framers presumably supported the 
legislative monopoly position.”139 This unwarranted 
overemphasis of Locke’s influence is not limited to the 
nondelegation doctrine but rather is endemic among some 
“[t]heorists . . . committed to at least one version of foundational 
rights, [who] claim to look at the American past but see little 
more than John Locke.”140 
Claims that Locke’s nondelegation proposition or even 
Locke’s writings generally were a central influence on the 
drafting of the Constitution appear to be false. Instead, the 
historical record indicates, as will be discussed, that: (1) Locke’s 
nondelegation argument appears little mentioned in America in 
the years leading up to the Constitution’s drafting; (2) limitations 
on delegation in general seem little discussed during the drafting 
and ratification of the Constitution; (3) Locke’s primary influence 
in the colonies was in the justification of revolution and among 
the clergy, who were drawn to Locke’s religious preoccupations; 
(4) by the time the Constitution was drafted, the evidence 
indicates that Locke’s influence on politics had already declined 
dramatically in America; (5) in the 1780s, Locke was cited at 
times by the Anti-Federalists, but rarely if ever by the 
Federalists; and (6) Madison voiced wariness of Locke as a guide 
to separation of powers issues and, in his most extended 
discussion of the delegation of powers, Madison did not even 
mention Locke, but instead cited Montesquieu as “the great 
oracle.” 141 
Nondelegation advocates have turned up almost no evidence 
that Locke had any influence regarding nondelegation in the 
years immediately before the Ratification. Nicholas Parrillo notes 
that “the secondary literature turns up only one instance of an 
 
 138 Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 72–74 (2015). 
 139 Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2132 (2004). 
 140 Martin Flaherty, History ‘Lite’ in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. 
L. REV. 523, 528 (1995). 
 141 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1. 
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American from 1765 through 1788 citing this point from Locke, 
in an anonymous newspaper essay” in discussing the states 
delegating their legislative powers to the Continental Congress, 
which is a very different subject.142 
Locke may have been influential in America before the 
Revolution started, but not afterwards, and his influence mostly 
came from his other writings, not from the Second Treatise relied 
on by supporters of the nondelegation doctrine. Few copies of 
Locke’s Two Treatises reached the colonies before 1724, and those 
known copies that initially arrived in the northern colonies were 
typically part of the Collected Works of John Locke, “three clumsy 
and faintly forbidding folio volumes.143 Only one edition of 
Locke’s Two Treatises was published during the colonial period in 
America, in 1773, and it was not printed again in America for 
164 years.144 As John Dunn stated, “The story of how the Two 
Treatises of Government was causally responsible (for what other 
sorts of responsibility could it bear?) for the direction of American 
political theory in the eighteenth century is, of course, largely 
false.”145 Pocock states that this era of Revolution and the slow 
emergence of republics occurred in “an intellectual scene 
dominated to the point of obsessiveness by concepts of virtue, 
patriotism, and corruption, in whose making and transmission 
Locke played little part”146 Steven Dworetz recounts how an 
earlier generation of scholars wildly overestimated Locke’s 
influence in America and that later scholars responded by 
underestimating Locke’s influence in the colonies as they 
considered rebellion.147 Dworetz demonstrates the influence of 
Locke’s Second Treatise by showing that twenty-five lines from it 
were quoted, word for word, by the “Jerseymen,” a well-armed 
movement fighting over land rights in the late 1740s.148  
 
 142 Nicholas R. Parrillo, Supplemental Paper to: A Critical Assessment of the 
Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the 
Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, at 6 n.11 (C. Boyden Gray Ctr. for the 
Study of the Admin. State, Working Paper No. 20-17, 2021), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3696902. 
 143 John Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth 
Century, in POLITICAL OBLIGATION IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL 
THEORY 70 (1980). 
 144 FORREST MCDONALD, NOVOUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 66 (1985). 
 145 JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE ‘TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT’ 7 (1969). 
 146 J.G.A Pocock, Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century, 3 J. INTERDISC. 
HIST. 119, 127 (1972). 
 147 STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 13–27 (1990). 
 148 Id. at 74. 
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Dworetz is careful to note, however, the sudden and drastic 
decline in Locke’s influence in the colonies once war started and 
as the colonists started turning their thoughts to “disquisitions 
on the design of governments and constitutions. This transition 
from the Revolutionary to the Constitutional era seems to have 
occurred around 1776; and, significantly, it coincided with, and 
was reflected in, a dramatic decline in Locke’s ‘rate of 
citation.’”149 The Framers apparently did not consider Locke a 
useful guide in how to design their new government.  
Noted historians Oscar Handlin and Lillian Handlin perhaps 
somewhat overstated the case when they claimed that “a careful 
reading of the Two Treatises leads to the inescapable conclusion 
that it was not likely that any among the Founding Fathers had 
read this bedrock of American political theory” but appear 
completely accurate when they stated that “his reputation in the 
colonies rested not on the treatises on government,” but rather on 
his work on epistemology and education.150 They added, perhaps 
missing a few counterexamples: “Locke wrote at length [in the 
Second Treatise] about two subjects that should have concerned 
Americans; yet as far as the record shows, his views never 
became subjects for conversation in the lanes of Boston or 
Philadelphia, or even grist for debaters, pamphleteers, and 
journalists.”151  
As Gary Rosen stated, “Locke was most cited during the 
struggle for independence, when basic matters of political right 
were at issue,” but founders turned to other philosophers “when 
institutions were a primary concern.”152 Locke was a large 
influence among the clergy in the colonies, who shared his 
religious preoccupations and embraced his justification for 
revolution.153 James Otis, one of the few colonists who publicly 
mentioned Locke’s views on nondelegation,154 was a link between 
 
 149 Id. at 44. 
 150 Oscar Handlin & Lilian Handlin, Who Read John Locke? Words and Acts in the 
American Revolution, 58 AM. SCHOLAR 546, 547 (1989). 
 151 Id. at 548. 
 152 GARY ROSEN, AMERICAN COMPACT: JAMES MADISON AND THE PROBLEM OF 
FOUNDING 205 n.40 (1999) (citing Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European 
Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
189, 192 (1984)). 
 153 DWORETZ, supra note 147, at 32. “From the perspective of eighteenth-century 
colonists, the theistic Locke was most likely to have been the Locke. . . This is especially 
so with the New England clergy, [who] were demonstrably conversant with Locke’s 
writings, and they had similar “religious preoccupations. They openly embraced Locke’s 
political ideas—for example, the justification for revolution. . .” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 154 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 184–88. 
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the clergy and revolutionary ferment.155 In the 1760s, Locke was 
cited on politics primarily about the relationship between Britain 
and the American colonists, and in the 1770s to justify breaking 
with England and writing new constitutions.156 Locke’s influence 
in America seems to have dropped dramatically after the start of 
the Revolutionary War and he was rarely cited after 1781.157 One 
study of American resistance pamphlets indicates that citations 
of Locke dropped off once the fighting started and that “after the 
fighting began in 1775, the revolutionary writers began to change 
their focus away from resistance theory, and direct invocation of 
Locke became more rare.”158 
Locke had little influence in the drafting of the Constitution 
and more influence among those who opposed the final 
document. Locke had “relatively little to say about specific 
institutions.”159 and so it is “not surprising that his influence 
was . . . very indirect on those writing the Constitution.”160 
Locke’s Second Treatise ends with a chapter entitled “Of the 
Dissolution of Government” and, as Forrest McDonald notes, “As 
to what legitimately follows the dissolution of government, 
however, the chapter is ambiguous.”161 
Locke was rarely publicly cited by the Federalists during the 
1780s, at least in ways that show up in the historical record.162 
During the 1780s, Locke was cited more often, however, by the 
Anti-Federalists, so his influence during the drafting period 
seems to have been primarily with those opposing the 
Constitution as drafted.163 Anti-Federalists were drawn to 
Locke’s natural-rights individualism.164  
 
 155 DWORETZ, supra note 147, at 54 (“Otis, to be sure, was not a man of the cloth. But 
he did have close ties to some radical and influential ministers—close enough for one 
prominent Tory to identify him as the driving force behind the notorious ‘Black Regiment’ 
of seditious preachers.”). 
 156 DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 143 (1988). 
 157 Donald S. Lutz, The Intellectual Background to the American Founding, 21 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 2327, 2336 (1990). 
 158 Alex Tuckness, Discourses of Resistance in the American Revolution, 64 J. HIST. 
IDEAS 547, 550 (2003). 
 159 Lutz, supra note 157, at 144. See also John Dunn, Consent in the Political Theory 
of John Locke, 10 HIST. J. 153, 153–54 (1967). 
 160 LUTZ, supra note 156, at 2347. See also Flaherty, supra note 140, at 546 (“[T]he 
constitution the Americans advanced was fully consistent with Locke, and at times 
augmented with Lockean references, though . . . it owed little to the philosopher 
directly.”). 
 161 MCDONALD, supra note 144, at 145. 
 162 LUTZ, supra note 156, at 145. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Daniel Walker Howe, Introduction: Anti-Federalist/Federalist Dialogue and Its 
Implications for Constitutional Understanding, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989). 
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Merle Curti, a great defender of Locke’s influence in America, 
stated “Treatises of Civil Government was seldom cited in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787. . .” 165 and Curti gives as an 
example of such rare citation a statement by an Anti-Federalist who 
later walked out of Convention without signing the Constitution.166 
Even Jerome Huyler, in a book chapter attempting to prove Locke’s 
influence on the drafting of the Constitution, comes up mostly dry. 
Huyler points only to Locke’s influence on such general topics as the 
sanctity of property, the importance of enlightened reason, and 
equal protection.167 Even when Huyler points out someone in the 
Founding Era who was influenced by Locke, it was Samuel Adams, 
then an Anti-Federalist, who “frequently” quoted Locke 
“verbatim.”168  
Donald Lutz, in a noted study of citations during the 
Founding Era, found that the observable influence of 
Montesquieu soared while Locke’s plummeted during the 
drafting of the Constitution and of state constitutions.169 Lutz 
concluded, “Locke’s influence [in the design of the Constitution or 
state constitutions] has been exaggerated . . . and finding him 
hidden in passages of the U.S. Constitution is an exercise that 
requires more evidence than has hitherto ever been provided.”170 
Madison himself seemed wary of trusting Locke on separation 
of powers issues, given how long-ago Locke had written and that 
Locke was writing about monarchical British government with a 
Parliament that ill represented the people. Writing as “Helvidius” 
in a 1793 newspaper debate with Alexander Hamilton, Madison 
argued that for separation of powers issues, “our own reason and 
our own constitution, are the best guides” since “a just analysis” of 
“the powers of government, according to their executive, legislative 
and judiciary qualities are not to be expected in the works of the 
most received jurists, who wrote before a critical attention was paid 
 
 165 Merle Curti, The Great Mr. Locke: America's Philosopher, 1783–1861, 11 
HUNTINGTON LIB. BULL. 107, 135 (1937) (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, 437 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)). 
 166 Id. at 135 n.1 (“Luther Martin cited Locke to prove that individuals, under 
primitive conditions, are equally free and independent, and that the case was the same 
with states until they surrendered their equal authority.”). “A strong anti-Federalist 
opposed to the plan for a strong central government, Martin displayed his disapproval of 
what the Convention produced by walking out without signing the Constitution.” Luther 
Martin, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Luther-
Martin [http://perma.cc/X5PN-JD5G] (last visited Apr. 18, 2021). 
 167 JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOUNDING 
ERA 251–73 (1995).  
 168 Id. at 266. 
 169 Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-
Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 192 (1984). 
 170 Id. at 192–93.  
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to those objects, and with their eyes too much on monarchical 
governments.”171 Madison seemed to recognize that with a 
democratically elected president, the Founders would be creating a 
very different government than Locke’s England, so they should not 
trust Locke’s analysis.  
Madison added that Locke and Montesquieu “are evidently 
warped by a regard to the particular government of England, to 
which one of them owed allegiance; and the other professed an 
admiration bordering on idolatry.”172 Madison clearly distrusted 
Locke’s teachings about how governments should be structured, 
given Locke’s “warped” regard. Locke’s paltry influence during the 
drafting of the Constitution, almost all with the Anti-Federalists, 
should not be allowed magically to insert a nondelegation doctrine 
into the Constitution and hence overrule the decisions of the 
Framers and the First Congress. reject. For the Court to adopt a 
robust nondelegation doctrine absent in the Constitution and 
based on Locke’s outdated dictum would be akin to the Court 
siding with the Anti-Federalists and their allegiance to Locke in 
rejecting the Framers’ decisions.  
As evidence of Locke’s purported deep influence on the 
drafting of the Constitution, Wurman cites a book by Bernard 
Bailyn on the ideological foundations of the American 
Revolution,173 not on the drafting of the Constitution, two 
fundamentally different eras and enterprises and influences in 
one might have nothing to do with the other. Bailyn’s book 
indicates that Locke was cited before the Revolutionary War on 
justifications for revolt, such as natural rights and the “social 
and governmental contract,” but nowhere indicates that Locke 
was a significant influence in the drafting of the Constitution.174 
Bailyn instead notes that it was writers like “Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Burlamaqui, and Vattel” who were cited “on the principles of civil 
government.”175 As noted by Steven Dworetz, Bailyn’s book 
 
 171 “Helvidius” Number 1, [24 August] 1793, FOUNDERS ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-15-02-0056 [http://perma.cc/X66L-
U6KY] (citing 15 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 66–74 (Thomas A. 
Mason et al. eds., 1985)). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Wurman, supra note 66, at 29 n.146 (citing BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27–30 (1992)). 
 174 Id. at 27. 
 175 Id. (“In pamphlet after pamphlet the American writers cited Locke on natural 
rights and on the social and governmental contract, Montesquieu and later Delolme on 
the character of British liberty and on the institutional requirements for its attainment, 
Voltaire on the evils of clerical oppression, Beccaria on the reform of criminal law, 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel on the laws of nature and of nations, and on 
the principles of civil government.”). 
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argues “that the politics and political thought of the American 
Revolution had been decisively conditioned and constrained by 
an essentially non-Lockean ideological tradition.”176 
Wurman then cites to a book by Alan Gibson that argues 
that “the Lockean variation of the principles of classical 
liberalism” is at “the core of the Founders’ political thought,” but 
this tells us nothing about Locke’s Second Treatise or 
nondelegation.177 Moreover, Gibson’s new edition of this book 
states that the work of noted historian J.G.A. Pocock “has led 
scholars to direct attention away from the influence of the 
political thought of John Locke in the eighteenth century and 
particularly in the American Founding.”178 Gibson also discusses 
how American colonists in the 1780s turned away from the 
radical Whiggism exemplified by Locke to “profoundly reconsider 
the set of assumptions that they held about republican 
government.”.179 This provides yet another explanation for the 
precipitous decline of Locke’s influence in America when the 
Revolution started. Wurman’s last basis for his foundational 
claim regarding Locke’s influence on the Constitution is a law 
review article by Jack Rakove, which states the Founders were 
“eclectically conversant with the works of luminaries like 
Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, and Blackstone” in a long 
list of similar influences, including among many others 
“European authorities as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Delolme” and 
“the legacy of Newtonian science. . .”180 Rakove’s long list hardly 
gives Locke’s influence primacy of place in influencing the 
drafting of the Constitution in general, let alone delegation in 
particular. 
Aaron Gordon claims that “Locke’s condemnation of 
legislative delegation was frequently cited by statesmen and 
commentators in late-Eighteenth and early-Nineteenth Century 
America. . .”, but his only sources from the Founding name Locke 
for this point appear to be a 1763 political pamphlet by James Otis 
discussing Locke’s argument and an 1818 John Adams letter in 
 
 176 DWORETZ, supra note 147, at 17–18. 
 177 Wurman, supra note 66, at 29 n.146 (quoting ALAN GIBSON, INTERPRETING THE 
FOUNDING: GUIDE TO THE ENDURING DEBATES OVER THE ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 13–21 (2006)). 
 178 Id. at 35. For an extended discussion of whether the Founding Generation adopted 
Lockean ideals, see supra pp. 13–18. 
 179 Id. at 47 (describing the disagreement between Wills and Jayne).  
 180 Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity through History (Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 
1598 (1997). Rakove helpfully provides a list of historians to consult on the influences on 
late eighteenth-century political thinking in America, including the above-mentioned 
Bernard Bailyn, John Dunn, “and, of course, J.G.A. Pocock . . .” Id. at 1598 n.32. 
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which Adams, then in his 80s, in tracing the sources of the 
Revolution, copied part of the Otis pamphlet from more than a 
half-century earlier.181 That Gordon’s only apparent evidence 
naming Locke is the text of the same pamphlet in two different 
forms, one from the pre-Revolutionary era and the other from 
more than thirty years after the drafting, indicates how very little 
influence Locke had on the drafting of the Constitution, especially 
given Gordon’s obviously meticulous research to dig up even the 
slightest shred of evidence of nondelegation at the Founding.  
Moreover, the Otis pamphlet cited by Gordon actually 
undercuts his nondelegation argument, since it constitutes the 
argument that Parliament can delegate legislative power to 
subordinate legislatures, and that the legislatures of the colonies 
should not be easily stripped of their legislative powers, 
subordinate though they were, because of the natural and 
equitable rights of the colonists.182 Otis stated: “The supreme 
national legislative cannot be altered justly ‘till the 
commonwealth is dissolved, nor a subordinate legislative taken 
away without forfeiture or other good cause.”183 Otis argued that 
Locke’s assertion that a legislature’s “whole power is not 
transferable” should not prevent the recognition of colonial 
legislatures.184 Doing so would not transfer the whole power of 
Parliament but rather a limited power to legislate on subjects 
pertinent to the colonies. In doing so, Otis was not following 
Locke’s dictum against delegation designed to protect 
Parliament’s power from the King, but rather completely 
changing it. Otis took Locke’s principles, “which were designed 
originally to support claims to parliamentary supremacy in late 
seventeenth-century England, and refashioned these principles 
to provide theoretical justification for the legitimacy of colonial 
assemblies as autonomous institutions” despite Parliament’s 
supremacy.”185 Otis was not citing Locke to condemn legislative 
delegation but rather to request it for the colonies. 
 
 181 Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation Misinformation: A Rebuttal To “Delegation At The 
Founding” And Its Progeny (April 30, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561062 
(manuscript at 19 n.114) (citing JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 
ASSERTED AND PROVED (1763) and Letter to William Wirt (Mar. 7, 1818), in WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS 293 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856)). 
 182 JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (1763) 
(“[C]olonists will have an equitable right notwithstanding any such forfeiture of charter, 
to be represented in Parliament, or to have some new subordinate legislature among 
themselves. It would be best if they had both.”). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Lee Ward, James Otis and the Americanization of John Locke, 4 AM. POL. 
THOUGHT 181, 182 (2015). 
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Gordon also relies for nondelegation at the Founding on an 
1818 letter from John Adams, which Gordon claims “likewise 
expressed agreement with Locke’s disapproval of legislative 
delegation.”186 However, the text is evidence that Locke was 
influential before the Revolution, but that his influence declined 
dramatically thereafter. In the letter, Adams described the Otis 
pamphlet as one of the influences of the Revolution and 
something he had been very familiar with back then but it 
appears he had not seen it since.187 That Gordon refers to the 
same pamphlet in two different forms, the pamphlet itself 
decades before the ratification of the Constitution and a copying 
out of some of the pamphlet decades after, undermines his claim 
that Locke’s condemnation of delegation was much discussed at 
the Founding.  
Gordon also claims as evidence instances where colonists 
complained about Parliament’s delegation of power to the King, 
including a 1774 tract by Thomas Jefferson objecting to 
delegation of power in England to the King188 However, in his 
other examples, he does not state that Locke was even 
mentioned, which indicates Locke’s waning influence in the 
colonies. Also, Parliament as representative of the people 
(however poorly) delegating to a royal monarch is very different 
than Congress delegating to an elected President, so criticizing 
Parliament’s delegation of power to a monarch does not show 
how Americans would feel about Congress delegating to a 
democratically elected president. 
Locke recognized the necessity of delegating legislative 
power and allowed that the Executive would share some 
legislative power. Lee Ward noted that Locke’s theory of 
delegated powers is “sufficiently comprehensive to provide for the 
establishment of a system of laws that would provide 
independent constitutional authority for both the supreme 
legislative power and a supreme Executive power that holds 
some share of the legislative power.”189 Merrill asserted that 
Locke himself seems to have thought that Parliament could 
 
 186 Gordon, supra note 43, at 740–41. 
 187 From John Adams to William Wirt, 7 March 1818, FOUNDERS ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6863 [http://perma.cc/BQ2A-TVBX] 
(citing JOHN ADAMS, THE ADAMS PAPERS (early access document to forthcoming final 
authoritative source), https://founders.archives.gov/content/volumes#Adams 
[http://perma.cc/72BE-7RZA]). 
 188 Gordon, supra note 43, at 741 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF 
THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (1774), in 1 MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 112–13 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829)). 
 189 Ward, supra note 185, at 193. 
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delegate legislative power to the King under certain 
circumstances and that Locke “believed the executive had 
inherent authority to act with the force of law, subject to being 
overridden by subsequent action of the legislature.”190 Merrill 
also showed that Locke may have allowed for delegation of 
legislative power where the supreme legislative body had given 
its sanction. Locke asserted that no edict of any other entity can 
have “have the force and obligation of a Law, which has not its 
Sanction from that Legislative, which the publick has chosen and 
appointed.”191 Merrill notes that this could mean that “the 
legislature does have the power to confer authority on other 
persons to act with the force of law, provided it gives its ‘sanction’ 
to this outcome. . .”192 
Locke’s position restricting legislative delegation was far 
from universal, even in England in his day. Philip Hamburger 
noted that Locke’s position was one that “Englishmen of 
whiggish views tended to argue. . .”193 Hamburger further 
describes how the Whigs themselves arguably violated the 
principle described by Locke by passing the Septennial Act, 
which replaced triennial elections with elections every seven 
years, against the objection of the Tories.194 “Taking up whiggish 
arguments, Tories complained that Parliament had reconveyed 
its power.”195 According to Hamburger, neither political party in 
England had so fixed a position on delegation that they were 
“unwilling to shift gears when it suited them.”196 
It is important to note that the Framers rejected England’s 
form of government and constructed a system of government far 
different from that of Locke’s England. In Britain in the 1680s, 
legislative power was held by a combination of the King, Lords, 
and Commons, while the “king alone was supreme in the 
monarchical functions.”197 While Parliament was hardly a 
completely democratic institution, the monarchy was not at all 
democratic. Locke’s views on delegation is an aspect of the fact 
that “the deep structure of Locke’s account of politics is 
 
 190 Merrill, supra note 139, at 2133 (“The principal complication is that Locke in fact 
was not opposed to all sharing of legislative power in the functional sense, because he 
endorsed the concept of the executive prerogative.”). 
 191 Id. at 2134 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 356 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)). 
 192 Id. 
 193 HAMBURGER, supra note 119, at 381. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 382. 
 196 Hamburger, supra note 117, at 97. 
 197 Suri Ratnapala, John Locke's Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A Re-
Evaluation, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 218 (1993). 
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profoundly democratic.”198 And so it makes sense that Locke 
would in general condemn delegation of legislative power from an 
at least partially representative Parliament to an unelected 
monarch.199 However, the Framers might not have thought that 
such condemnation would apply to America’s Congress 
delegating to the Executive Branch. Further, the delegation 
notorious in Locke’s day was “The Statute of Proclamations”, 
passed to give legislative authority to proclamations of Henry 
VIII in 1539. This delegation was completely unlike Congress’s 
delegation to federal agencies today, in that it gave Henry VIII as 
king-in-council power to create law on almost any topic, 
unconnected from the policy dictated by or the direction of 
Parliament, and with few limitations. 
Defenders of the nondelegation doctrine have argued that it 
is foundational.200 However, nondelegation was not a significant 
issue in the drafting or ratification of the Constitution. Nicholas 
Parrillo, after an exhaustive search, stated, “Legislative 
delegation was not an object of sustained constitutional 
discussion.”201 The few references he did find give little indication 
of the contours of any proposed bar on delegation, Parrillo notes, 
“because the references that speak to such issues appear to have 
been rejected by majorities of their audiences, or involved types 
of delegations categorically different from those that Congress 
makes to an agency.”202 Posner and Vermeule combed the 
ratification debates for discussion of delegation and found 
“nothing of any real relevance.”203 If the nondelegation doctrine 
were a foundational element of the Constitution as some claim, 
surely more than just a passing mention of nondelegation would 
appear somewhere in the vast records of the multitude of debates 
at the Convention and during ratification, many about 
constitutional meaning. However, as Mortenson and Bagley 
assert, “there is trifling evidence of a nondelegation doctrine even 
being argued for by aggressive legal innovators, let alone broadly 
accepted by the Founders as a group.”204 
 
 198 Ian Shapiro, John Locke's Democratic Theory, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND 
A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 309, 310 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003). 
 199 Ward, supra note 185, at 193. 
 200 Redish, supra note 15, at 366 (“Without enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, the 
foundational precepts of the American system of government are seriously undermined.”). 
 201 Parrillo, supra note 142 (manuscript at 7 n.12). 
 202 Id. at 8. 
 203 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1734 (“A search for references to delegation 
in the ratification debates of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, 
Pennsylvania (including the Harrisburg Proceedings), Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina turned up nothing relevant.”). 
 204 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 293. 
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Another theory argues that nondelegation is an essential 
part of agency theory, and that as an agent of the public, 
Congress is prohibited from delegating the powers granted to it. 
This is supposedly derived from the common law maxim delegata 
potestas non potest delegari—one with delegated authority lacks 
the power to delegated it further.205 Sotirios Barber noted that 
this maxim is primarily seen in the common law of agency, 
though has been applied as a rule of constitutional law, and 
argues that both may be mere applications of “the general 
principle of nondelegation which attaches to any delegated 
power” without expressed contrary provisions.206 Where this 
general principle resides, Barber does not say. 
The Delegata maxim and the associated agency doctrine seem 
to be a post hoc explanation justifying the nondelegation doctrine, 
not an influence on the Framers. The Delegata maxim does not 
appear much discussed in the Founding Era and neither it nor any 
variant appears in the “tens of thousands of pages of searchable 
archival material from the Continental Congress, from the drafting 
and ratification of the Constitution, and from the records of the first 
ten years of Congress . . .”207 and did not show up in any form in the 
United States federal and state case reports until 1794.208 
Mortenson and Bagley note a fundamental flaw in the proposition 
that agency rules govern constitutional meaning: those making that 
proposal “cannot point to any evidence that the private law agency 
analogy should govern constitutional interpretation.”209 
More importantly, it appears that the Delegata maxim, as 
understood in the Founding Era, would permit the delegation of the 
power to do specific acts, and only bar the transfer of the whole 
powers of a governmental officer or entity. For example, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case Respublica v. Duquet 
upheld the delegation of legislative power by the state to the City of 
Philadelphia, and in the 1809 case Hunt v. Burrel, the court held 
that an undersheriff could validly delegate the power to execute a 
writ.210 The court held that the Delegata maxim is correct “when 
 
 205 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary 
Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 254 (2010) (stating “Locke developed the 
nondelegation doctrine out of an elementary maxim of the law of agency, delegata potestas 
non potest delegari—delegated powers cannot be further delegated.”). 
 206 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER 26–27 (1975). 
 207 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 297. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799); Hunt v. Burrel, 5 Johns. 137 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1809).  
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duly applied; for to make a deputy by a deputy, in the sense of 
the maxim, implies an assignment of the whole power, which a 
deputy cannot make. A deputy has general powers, which he 
cannot transfer; but he may constitute a servant, or bailiff, to do 
a particular act.”211 
In other words, as understood in the early years of the 
Republic, the Delegata maxim would not prohibit Congress from 
a limited delegation of its legislative power to a federal agency, 
but rather would only bar a delegation of its whole legislative 
power to another entity.  
The Delegata maxim has many exceptions that “give away 
the game,” in the words of Posner and Vermeule.212 They cite the 
exceptions listed by Justice Story, an early explicator of that 
maxim: from the express language, or from fair presumptions, 
from the particular transaction, or through the usage of trade.213 
If Congress’s legislation must be built on explicitly enumerated 
powers, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, they argue 
that “[n]ondelegation proponents must explain why those 
enumerated powers don’t represent just the sort of provision 
that, in Story’s framework, create a ‘fair presumption’ that the 
delegate may redelegate its powers as necessary or 
appropriate.”214 
Justice Story explained the bar on an agent delegating her 
powers in his Commentaries on the Law of Agency. “One, who has 
a bare power or authority from another to do an act, must 
execute it himself, and cannot delegate his authority to another; 
for this being a trust or confidence reposed in him personally, it 
cannot be assigned to a stranger . . .”215 Justice Story himself, 
though, notes the limits of the Delegata maxim, stating that 
“there are cases, in which the authority may be implied; as where 
it is indispensable by the laws, in order to accomplish the end; or 
it is the ordinary custom of trade; or it is understood by the 
parties to be the mode, in which the particular business would or 
might be done . . .”216 Duff and Whiteside tartly note, “In other 
 
 211 Id. 
 212 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1733. 
 213 Id. (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 14–15 
(Charles P. Greenough ed., Little, Brown & Co. 9th ed. rev. 1882)). 
 214 Id. 
 215 Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A 
Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 168 (1929) (quoting 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 13 (C.C. Little & J. Brown 2nd 
ed. rev. 1839)). 
 216 Id. at 169 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 14 
(C.C. Little & J. Brown 2nd ed. rev. 1839)). 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 12:57 PM 
2021] Originalism Isn’t What It Used to Be 749 
words, delegated authority cannot be re-delegated unless there is 
some reason why it should be.”217 Even under agency law at the 
time the Constitution was drafted, then, Congress could have 
delegated its legislative power in order to accomplish the 
purposes of legislation. Also, delegation by Congress has been the 
norm since the Founding,218 so it is clearly customary by now and 
understood as a significant part of how government functions. 
Furthermore, the Delegata maxim itself seems to have arisen 
originally from a printer’s error. In 1929, Duff and Whiteside 
conducted an extensive search for the origins of the Delegata 
doctrine, tracing it back from its use by American and English 
sources and to a misprinted Medieval document. They concluded 
that instead of asserting that delegated power cannot be itself 
delegated, the original meaning was that the power of the King 
cannot “be so delegated, that the primary (or regulating) power 
does not remain with the King himself” and so the Delegata 
doctrine owes “its vogue in the common law to the carelessness of 
a sixteenth century printer.”219 Under the doctrine’s original 
meaning, Congress would be permitted to delegate legislative 
power to federal agencies so long as it retains the primary and 
regulating power to legislate itself, something that would 
virtually always be true in a system where Congress’s laws take 
precedence over federal agencies’ regulations. 
D. The Nondelegation Doctrine’s Brief Life and Long Dormancy 
in the Supreme Court 
As has been often noted, the Supreme Court’s history of 
applying the nondelegation doctrine in any meaningful way 
started well after the Founding and it did not invalidate 
legislation based on that doctrine until 1935, and not after that 
year. The first mention of the nondelegation doctrine, indirectly, 
was in the Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, when the 
Court did not respond directly to the nondelegation argument 
and then in Wayman v. Southard in 1825, Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion seems to indicate that Congress cannot 
delegate powers purely legislative except when it can, and the 
line between important subjects which cannot be delegated and 
other subjects which may be delegated is difficult to draw. 220  
 
 217 Id. 
 218 See generally Chabot, supra note 94. 
 219 Duff & Whiteside, supra note 215, at 173. 
 220 Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813). The 
statute in question authorized the president to lift a statutory embargo if he determined 
that the countries involved either had indicated respect for the commerce of the United 
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In their extensive analysis of the history of the 
nondelegation doctrine, Whittington and Iuliano noted, “[t]he 
Court had remarkably little to say regarding the delegation of 
legislative power from the late Marshall Court through the 
remainder of the nineteenth century” and “avoided serious 
engagement with the principles and standards of 
nondelegation . . . .”221 It was not until the Field v. Clark222 in 
1892 that the Court addressed nondelegation more directly. 
There, the court considered a statute that delegated to the 
President the ability to trigger higher tariff rates for countries 
that failed to participate in reciprocal free trade. In response to 
the argument that this inappropriately delegated legislative 
powers to the President, the Court stated, “That Congress cannot 
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle 
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance 
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”223 
Still, the Court upheld the delegation in the statute at issue, 
finding that it did not give the President legislative power.224 
The Court followed that with a 1904 case concerning 
whether Congress could delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury 
authority to prevent adulterated tea from entering the American 
market.225 The Court found that “Congress legislated on the 
subject as far as was reasonably practicable” and that preventing 
delegation of further discretionary decision-making denying to 
Executive officials with discretionary power would in essence 
declare “that the plenary power vested in Congress to regulate 
foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted.”226 Hence, 
the practical necessity of Congress delegating some decisions to 
accomplish its goals justified the delegation. The Court further 
justified delegation to an agency to fill in the details of a statute 
in the Grimaud case in 1911, noting its use since the Founding, 
 
States. The Supreme Court did not respond to this argument directly but merely noted, 
“we can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in 
reviving the [law allowing trade], either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment 
should direct.” Id. at 388. In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43, 6 L. Ed. 253 (1825), 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion added little clarity on what legislative delegation is 
permitted, stating, “[t]he line has not been exactly drawn which separates those 
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those 
of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who 
are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.” Id. 
 221 Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 396 (2017). 
 222 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 223 Id. at 692. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904). 
 226 Id. at 496. 
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and that when Congress “indicated its will” with legislation, it 
could delegate the “power to fill up the details” by the 
establishment of administrative rules and regulations.227 
The Court created a more explicit rule regarding what 
delegation is permitted in the case J.W. Hampton, Jr. v. United 
States, where it held that Congress could delegate so long as it lay 
down an “intelligible principle” to guide the Executive Branch, 
which would render it “the mere agent of the law-making 
department . . . .”228 The “intelligible principle” rule remains the 
primary standard by which courts determine whether delegation is 
constitutionally permissible.229 The Court broadly approved 
delegation for a period thereafter. “By the Progressive Era, the 
Court was willing to characterize almost any action that a 
government official performed as nonlegislative.”230 
The Court approving every congressional delegation came to 
a screeching, albeit brief, halt in 1935, in the cases Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan231 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation 
v. United States,232 both concerning the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (“NIRA”). In Panama Refining, the Court struck 
down the delegation to the President of power to prohibit 
transportation of petroleum and its products in excess of state 
permission upon the Court’s finding that “Congress has declared 
no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule.”233 
In Schechter, the Court objected to legislation authorizing the 
President to approve those “codes of fair competition”234 that 
were submitted to him by trade associations regarding such 
issues as labor practices and minimum wages.235 In his 
concurring opinion to Schechter, Justice Cardozo stated, “[t]he 
delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this 
code is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. 
It is unconfined and vagrant . . . .”236 
 
 227 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 521 (1911). 
 228 276 U.S. 394, 409, 411 (1928). 
 229 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1989) (listing the broad 
delegations the Court has permitted). 
 230 Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 221, at 399. 
 231 293 U.S. at 388 (1935). 
 232 295 U.S. at 495 (1935). 
 233 293 U.S. at 430. 
 234 295 U.S. at 529. 
 235 295 U.S. at 541–42 (“In view of the scope of that broad declaration and of the 
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in 
approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and 
industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code-making 
authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”). 
 236 295 U.S. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
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These are “the only two cases in which the Supreme Court 
has struck down a federal law for violating the nondelegation 
doctrine.”237 The nondelegation doctrine has been virtually 
dormant, at least at the Supreme Court level, since 1935, leading 
to Cass Sunstein’s famous quip that the nondelegation doctrine 
“has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”238 
Since 1935, the Supreme Court has continued to worry over 
the nondelegation doctrine, returning to it on occasion never to 
revive it, but also never quite willing either to declare it defunct. 
While it purports to enforce the requirement of an intelligible 
principle to permit delegation, even when Congress’s direction to 
the Executive Branch is less than intelligible, “the Court usually 
merely interprets the authorizing statute to avoid the 
difficulty.”239 In the recent case, Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns, the Court continued to uphold the intelligible principle 
test.240 There, Justice Scalia writing for a unanimous Court, 
indicated that permitting delegation where there is an 
“intelligible principle” limiting and guiding the exercise of 
delegated power was, in the words of William K. Kelley, “both a 
sound way to implement the Constitution and simultaneously 
judicially unenforceable.”241 
III. THE DEVOLUTION OF ORIGINALISM AND ITS GROWING ATTACK 
ON REPRESENTATIONAL DEMOCRACY 
A. Original Originalism 
Despite its long dormancy and only one year of life, the 
nondelegation doctrine has remained a constant topic among 
legal scholars debating whether it still exists in any meaningful 
way and why or why not. While some have proclaimed regularly 
that the nondelegation doctrine is dead, opposing professors often 
respond, in the words of Phillip Hamburger, “as if in a Monty 
Python skit. ‘Not dead yet!’”242 Some originalist scholars and 
others interested in curbing the power of the administrative state 
have done their best to resuscitate the doctrine. Suzanna Sherry 
asked, “[h]ow many ways can conservatives spin an originalist 
 
 237 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 283–84. 
 238 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000). 
 239 HAMBURGER, supra note 119, at 378. 
 240 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001). 
 241 William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and Constitutional 
Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2112 (2017). 
 242 HAMBURGER, supra note 119, at 378. 
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tale to support their deregulatory, small-government vision? The 
answer is apparently infinite.”243 
That originalists would urge courts to be more active in 
overturning Congress’s legislation and setting such basic policy 
as the size of government and its regulation is a direct assault on 
the foundations of originalism, in that originalism was originally 
conceived as a justification for judicial restraint and as protection 
for Congress’s legislative power from judicial activism. 
Originalism was first designed to prevent “Government by 
Judiciary,” the title of an enormously influential “originalism 
manifesto,”244 but now some originalists want the courts to seize 
the wheel of government and engage in judicial activism.245 
Originalists first complained that activist judges were using their 
judicial power to amend rather than interpret the Constitution, 
but now some would have the Court create as a robust 
constitutional mandate the nondelegation amendment that was 
rejected for the Constitution.246 Explaining this sea change in the 
nature and purpose of originalism requires a review of how 
dramatically originalism has mutated since it was first 
conceived.  
Originalism as a movement began in the early 1970s among 
conservatives fighting back against the liberal decisions of what 
they viewed as an “activist” Warren Court. 247 While some earlier 
court decisions had had an originalist bent, of course,248 judges 
rarely did much historical research to determine the original 
intent of the Framers or the original meaning of the 
 
 243 Suzanna Sherry, The Imaginary Constitution, 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 442 
(2019). 
 244 ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 60 (2018). 
 245 Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial 
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2005). 
 246 See supra text accompanying notes 40–47. 
 247 James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1335, 1347 (1997). James Fleming called originalism “a conservative ideology that 
emerged in reaction against the Warren Court” but “did not exist” before that time. 
 248 For example, see Chief Justice Taney's words in Dred Scott: 
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in 
relation to this unfortunate race, . . . should induce the court to give to the 
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they 
were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. 
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2009) (citing Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856) and these words as an example of 
“strong originalism”). But see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 407 
(2011) (“Taney's self-conscious embrace of originalism even when it leads to moral 
depravity . . . was bad originalism. . . . These errors raise a suspicion that Taney's 
aggressive positivism was but a façade for his abject racism.”). 
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Constitution, and instead “cherry-picked evidence of original 
meaning to suit their purposes.”249 
The introduction of originalism is often credited to Robert 
Bork, who as a law professor in 1971 published a law review 
article that lamented how far he thought the Warren Court had 
strayed from the Constitution’s text and original meaning.250 
Bork declared that in cases of constitutional interpretation, “[t]he 
judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair 
implications, and not construct new rights.”251 Doing so protects 
Congress and state legislatures and their setting of policy, Bork 
argued, and he asserted that “courts must accept any value 
choice the legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a 
choice made in the framing of the Constitution.”252 Bork’s view of 
judicial restraint, that courts should accept legislation unless it is 
clearly unconstitutional, is akin to, though weaker than, that of 
Harvard law professor James Bradley Thayer, who in an 
influential 1893 law review article, urged that courts should 
invalidate a statute only if its unconstitutionality is “so clear that 
it is not open to rational question.”253  
Though originalism has since evolved into a veritable 
smorgasbord of conflicting approaches and interpretations, two 
essential elements of most originalism approaches are the 
following. First is the idea that the meaning of the Constitution 
became fixed at its drafting or its ratification (or perhaps when 
the meaning is liquidated through practice).254 The second 
central pillar is the claim that the meaning of the Constitution 
once fixed should be a restraint on its interpretation unless or 
until the Constitution is amended.255  
Originalism has been defended on both positive and normative 
grounds. Among the positive grounds is the assertion that it 
 
 249 Jeremy Telman, Originalism as Fable (Reviewing Eric Segall, Originalism as 
Faith), 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741, 748 (2018)). 
 250 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L. J. 1 (1971). 
 251 Id. at 8. 
 252 Id. at 10–11. 
 253 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). For a discussion of Thayer’s thesis, see Richard A. 
Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519, 522 (2012). 
 254 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in 
Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015) (“The meaning of the constitutional 
text is fixed when each provision is framed and ratified: this claim can be called the 
Fixation Thesis. This thesis is one of two core ideas of originalist constitutional theory: 
the other is the Constraint Principle, which holds that the original meaning of the 
constitutional text should constrain constitutional practice.”). 
 255 Id. 
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provides the most accurate understanding of the meaning of the 
Constitution.256 Among normative grounds is the claim that 
jurisprudence based on originalism “facilitates the realization of a 
political system grounded on popular sovereignty.”257 Keith 
Whittington argued that originalism protects the effectiveness of 
the popular will that created the Constitution and that judges who 
fail to employ originalism could, through their rulings, set that will 
aside.258 Randy Barnett argued that originalism best protects 
substantive ideas of justice by protecting “background natural 
rights retained by the people” as a “constitutional assumption that 
is hard-wired into the meaning of the Constitution itself.”259 
McGinnis and Rappaport argued that the Constitution should be 
given its original meaning because only doing so will preserve the 
beneficial effects of the supermajoritarian process of the 
Constitution’s enactment and amendment, which affords “deep 
deliberation” and creates “the consensus and nonpartisanship 
necessary for fostering allegiance to a constitution that desirably 
regulates politics and society.”260 
The opposing view to originalism is living constitutionalism, 
perhaps most broadly defined as “simply in opposition to 
originalism.”261 Living constitutionalism is distinguished by 
incorporating “contemporary values and attitudes into the 
judicial ‘understanding’”262 of the Constitution, and treating it as 
“an adaptive document that responds to changing social and 
economic conditions through altered judicial interpretations of its 
central textual provisions.”263 Originalism at first focused on the 
intent of the drafters of the Constitution and so what has been 
 
 256 JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 117 (2013). 
 257 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (1999). 
 258 Id. at 156. 
 259 Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional 
Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 652–53 (2009). 
 260 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 256, at 33. 
 261 Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 
514 n.240 (2010). 
 262 Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional 
Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 295 n.46 (2010). 
 263 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 299 (2000) (quoted in 
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual 
Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1259 (2019), which discussed the 
varied definitions of living originalism). 
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called “the most important of originalist sources”264 is The 
Federalist, “which explained the Founders’ intent.”265  
In 1977, Raoul Berger published his originalism manifesto, 
Government by Judiciary, which asked, “[w]hy is the ‘original 
intention’ so important? . . . A judicial power to revise the 
Constitution transforms the bulwark of our liberties into a 
parchment barrier.”266 Berger offered this bulwark to defend the 
majoritarian power of Congress from “the tendency of legal 
liberalism to undermine legislative power and the rule of law.”267 
Berger’s book thus had a “majoritarian, restraintist thrust” as it 
was designed to protect legislative power from activist judges.268 
Because Berger argued that courts should follow the intent of the 
founders, Berger was labeled as a “strict intentionalist” by Paul 
Brest,269 who in 1981 coined the word “originalism.”270 By coining 
the word, Brest formalized originalism as a concept.271 
Berger’s book had an entire chapter devoted to the fact that 
the Framers explicitly excluded the judiciary from policymaking, 
rejecting the idea of judges’ participation in a Council of Revision 
of legislation, and citing the Framers in support.272 Nearly all 
who spoke on this subject at the Convention or during the 
ratification process agreed that judges should not be part of 
policy-forming in the legislative process.273 Given the Framers’ 
strident opposition to judicial policy-making, originalists should 
fiercely oppose judicial activism, even by originalist judges, and 
reject giving judges the power to construct a nondelegation 
doctrine that would enable them to act as a Council of Revision to 
overturn regulatory legislation they disagree with. 
 
 264 Frank B. Cross, Originalism-the Forgotten Years, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 38 (2012) 
(citing Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard, & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and 
Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 329 (2005)). 
 265 Edwin Meese III, Challenges Facing Our System of Justice, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
303, 307–08 (2005). See discussion of this point in Frank B. Cross, Originalism—The 
Forgotten Years, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 38 (2012). 
 266 BERGER, supra note 6. 
 267 JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 126 (2005). 
 268 Id. at 129. 
 269 Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of 
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L. J. 1063, 1089 (1981). 
 270 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980). 
 271 Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory 
of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (2018) (“Only after Brest invented the term 
“originalism” did originalists adopt the label and defend it.”). 
 272 BERGER, supra note 6, at 300 (“The Judiciary Was Excluded from Policymaking”). 
 273 Id. at 302 (citing BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18, 244 (1942)). 
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Berger argued that what the Supreme Court was actually 
doing was far more radical than merely formulating novel 
interpretations. The Court instead was engaged in “what Justice 
Harlan described as the Supreme Court’s ‘exercise of the 
amending power,’ its continuing revision of the Constitution 
under the guise of interpretation.”274 Berger said that his book 
was designed to “demonstrate that the Court was not designed to 
act, in James M. Beck’s enthusiastic phrase, as a ‘continuing 
constitutional convention’. . .”275  
Berger’s book stimulated such “an explosion of academic 
interest in the framers’ intent,” that “responding to Berger’s 
thesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry in 
constitutional scholarship.”276 Originalist scholarship in the 
1980s, influenced by Berger, also followed his lead and typically 
argued that “the liberal reformist use of modern judicial power 
threatened the rule of law and the formulation of public policy in 
legislatures.”277 Hence, judicial restraint and the protection of 
legislative power were the primary goals of early originalism. 
B. Attacks on Intentionalist Originalism 
With the advent of originalism, criticisms, sometimes harsh, 
were inevitable. However, even before originalism was conceived 
as a distinct method of constitutional interpretation, the use of 
history and original intent to determine the meaning of the 
Constitution had been harshly criticized. In his 1965 article “Clio 
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,” Alfred H. Kelly identified 
two almost inevitable problems with courts employing original 
intent to determine the meaning of the Constitution.278 One was 
the problem of “law office history,” where the courts pull out 
selective quotes from the Framers or elsewhere that buttress 
their points, without engaging in sufficient historical 
investigation to see the entire historical picture, then consider 
and cite only their favored authorities and texts while ignoring 
the rest.279 Kelly argued that the Court used this tool to engage 
in “extreme political activism, involving extensive judicial 
intervention in contemporary political problems” and as a 
 
 274 BERGER, supra note 6, at 1 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964)). 
 275 Id. at 2. 
 276 Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 745, 753 (1983) (footnote omitted). 
 277 O'NEILL, supra note 267, at 135. 
 278 Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965). 
 279 Id. at 122 n.13 (“By ‘law-office’ history, I mean the selection of data favorable to 
the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper 
evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered.”). 
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“precedent-breaking instrument” so that by purporting “to return 
to the aboriginal meaning of the Constitution” the Court could 
“declare that in breaking with precedent it was really 
maintaining constitutional continuity.”280 
A second hazard Kelly identified is how the Supreme Court, 
by stating and relying on their particular restatement of 
constitutional history, reifies that history, so that lesser courts 
must accept as true the Court’s account of history, however 
inaccurate. And even the Court itself must accept that reified 
history to some extent because of the principle of stare decisis. 
Kelly condemned the “creation of history a priori by what may be 
called ‘judicial fiat’ or ‘authoritative revelation’”281 Kelly further 
noted “In a sense, by quoting history, the Court made history, 
since what it declared history to be was frequently more 
important than what the history might actually have been.”282 
While early originalists had very different purposes than 
those of the courts that Kelly chastised, they faced similar 
critiques. An early attack came from Professor Paul Brest, who 
asserted, among other things, that it is difficult to determine the 
“intent” of a group of people, that doing so for the drafters or the 
ratifiers is almost impossible, and that even if that could be done, 
translating that intent to modern problems is another fraught 
challenge.283 Furthermore, there are considerable reasons to 
reject being governed by intentions from the Founding Era, when 
women and racial minorities were excluded from governmental 
decision-making.284 Larry Simon argued, “The Constitution was 
adopted by propertied, white males who had no strong incentives 
to attend to the concerns and interests of the impoverished, the 
nonwhites, or nonmales who were alive then, much less those of 
us alive today . . . .”285 Other critics piled on, objecting to modern 
Americans being ruled by an unchangeable (except through 
amendment) intent from centuries ago, the often-discussed “dead 
hand of the past.”286 
 
 280 Id. at 125. 
 281 Id. at 122. 
 282 Id. at 123. 
 283 Brest, supra note 270, at 214–15. 
 284 Id. at 230. 
 285 Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist 
Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1499 (1985). 
 286 Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 
357 (1985) (“The dead hand of the past ought not to govern, for example, our treatment of 
the liberty of free speech, and any theory of interpretation that demands that it does is a 
bad theory.”). 
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A notable early critic of the originalism project was Professor 
Jefferson Powell, who argued that the “vast majority of 
contemporary constitutional disputes involve facts, practices, and 
problems that were not considered or even dreamt of by the 
founders” and that applying the Constitution to questions it does 
not answer requires any interpreter to “use some process of 
generalization or analogy to go beyond what history can say.”287 
Powell also attacked the idea that the Framers of the 
Constitution intended or even expected that their intentions, 
sometimes stated in secretly conducted debates, govern the 
meaning of that document. Instead, Powell asserted that the 
“framers shared the traditional common law view . . . that the 
import of the document they were framing would be determined 
by reference to the intrinsic meaning of its words or through the 
usual judicial process of case-by-case interpretation.”288  
Madison himself counseled against using the intentions of 
the Framers as a guide to the meaning of the Constitution, 
saying that that the sense of the Framers “could never be 
regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the 
Constitution.”289 That the Framers did not intend that their 
intentions govern the meaning of the Constitution is evidenced 
by the fact that they kept secret their journals of the convention’s 
secretly conducted debates, at least until after the Constitution 
had been ratified.290 As C.A. Lofgren notes, “[t]his strongly hints 
that the delegates feared that if the journals were published, 
they could affect subsequent interpretation.”291 
C. Original Understanding Originalism 
These criticisms had teeth, and even Bork himself came to 
reject original intent originalism, saying no “even moderately 
sophisticated originalist” holds that interpretative weight should 
be given the subjective intent of the Framers.292 Some originalists 
then shifted their focus to the meaning of the Constitution held 
by the ratifiers instead.293 Since it was the ratification of the 
 
 287 H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 664–65 (1987). 
 288 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 903–04 (1985). 
 289 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1849). 
 290 Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. 
COMMENT. 77, 81 (1988). 
 291 Id. at 82. 
 292 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 218 (1990). 
 293 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113, 1137 (2003) (“The shift to 
original understanding was part of an increased recognition that it was the action of the 
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Constitution, not its drafting, that conferred on the Constitution 
its legitimacy to govern the public, it is the intention of the 
ratifiers, not the drafters, that matters, according to this theory. 
And, some argued, the intent of the ratifiers is not mere evidence 
of the Constitution’s meaning but rather determines that 
meaning, or as Charles Lofgren stated, “how the ratifiers 
understood the Constitution, and what they expected from it, 
defines its meaning.”294  
Original understanding originalism, however, retrospectively 
assigns the ratifiers a completely different task than the one they 
actually performed. The ratifiers did not need to understand all 
the various terms of the Constitution, as their focus was on a 
single question: should the Constitution be ratified?295 While the 
meaning of individual terms collectively mattered in that 
decision, the ratifiers never had to reach any group consensus on 
what any Constitutional term meant. Furthermore, determining 
the ratifiers’ collective understanding of the Constitution is 
impossible. The debates over ratifying the Constitution were a 
“cacophonous argument” and so are no valid guide to any 
consensus understanding of its terms.296 With such diverse and 
often contradictory sources, originalists can derive a host of 
perhaps contradictory yet plausible interpretations, “few 
conclusively verified or falsified.”297 With “the extraordinary 
diversity of the polemics the campaign produced, and the 
decentralized, unfocused nature”298 of the ratifiers’ discussions 
and debates, Jack Rakove concludes that it is almost impossible 
to “disaggregating a collective intention to ratify the Constitution 
into original understandings of particular clauses”299 rendering 
original understanding originalism unworkable. 
 
Constitution's Ratifiers—state ratifying conventions in the case of the original document 
and state legislatures in the case of the amendments—whose actions gave legal life to the 
otherwise dead words on paper drafted by the Philadelphia Convention and the 
Congresses proposing the amendments.”). 
 294 Lofgren, supra note 290, at 112. 
 295 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 17 (1996) (“The only understanding we can be entirely confident the 
majority of ratifiers shared was that they were indeed deciding whether the Constitution 
would ‘form a more perfect union’ than the Articles of Confederation . . . .”). 
 296 Id. at 132 (“That debate took the form not of a Socratic dialogue or an academic 
symposium but of a cacophonous argument in which appeals to principle and common 
sense and close analyses of specific clauses accompanied wild predictions of the good and 
evil effects that ratification would bring.”). 
 297 Id. at 133. 
 298 Rakove, supra note 180, at 1597. 
 299 Id. 
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D. Original Meaning Originalism 
Since original understanding originalism shared the same 
flaws as original intent originalism, some originalists created a new 
vision of originalism, one that would focus instead on the 
supposedly objective original public meaning of the text of the 
Constitution. Bork explained, “The search is not for a subjective 
intention. . . . [W]hat counts is what the public understood. . . . The 
original understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in 
secondary materials, such as debates at the [ratifying] conventions, 
public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the 
time, and the like.”300 Original public understanding originalism 
therefore tries to step away from the subjective meaning that those 
involved in the process may have intended and instead turns to a 
supposedly objective meaning to be gleaned from all sorts 
documents from the time. Original public understanding 
originalism thus turned originalism into “an empirical investigation 
of linguistic usage.”301 
The grave hazard of original public meaning originalism is 
that it strips words out of their context in the text of the 
Constitution and potentially allows any uses of those words 
during the Founding to be used to interpret the Constitution. 
Original meaning originalists “continue to cherry pick quotes and 
present this amateurish research as systematic historical 
inquiry. In this method there is no serious attention to 
establishing the relative influence of particular texts.”302 Seeking 
a single original public meaning at the Founding for many of the 
most important terms used in the Constitution is impossible.303 
This search will too often fail on critical issues and so on many of 
the most important issues would be a misbegotten method.304 
E. A Panoply of Originalisms  
Other varieties of originalism include libertarian 
originalism, typically based on the idea that the Constitution’s 
 
 300 BORK, supra note 292, at 144. 
 301 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 271, at 10. 
 302 Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L. J. 625, 627 (2008). 
 303 Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO STATE L. J. 609, 617 
(2008) (“The new originalism seeks the original public meaning of constitutional terms, 
but there is (was) no single such meaning, again at least for interesting constitutional 
terms.”). 
 304 James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1785, 1808 (2013) (“The quest for the original public meaning is misconceived because on 
most important provisions there will not be a definitive original public meaning that will 
be useful in resolving our disagreements, much less in resolving hard cases.”). 
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legitimacy is based on its protection of liberty and natural rights, 
rather than the consent of the governed,305 and progressive or 
“Living Originalism,” the idea that the Framers intended future 
generations to be free to interpret the standards and principals of 
the Constitution and so avoid a static and unworkable 
Constitution. Then there is original methods originalism, which 
calls for the meaning of the Constitution to be gleaned “using the 
interpretive methods that the enactors would have deemed 
applicable to it.”306 However, there was no agreed-on set of 
interpretive rules, given the conflicts and divisions of the 
Founding Era, “including a deep rift separating Federalists from 
Anti-Federalists and an even larger divide between popular and 
elite approaches to constitutional texts.”307  
This panoply of alternative and often conflicting originalist 
methods gives judges cart blanche to choose whichever method 
and sources best serve their personal preferences. Originalist 
judges regularly cite to Madison and/or Hamilton in The 
Federalist Papers, which indicates they are still focused on a 
primitive form of original intent in which they pick quotes from a 
few favored sources, choosing those from the Founding they 
would likely agree with.308 The biases of originalist judges are 
shown by which Founding Era texts they rely on. As Jamal 
Greene noted, “Discounting the views expressed by Brutus or the 
Federal Farmer in favor of those expressed by Publius is difficult 
to explain on the logic of original-meaning originalism.”309 
Far from originalism being a constraint on judges, the vast 
smorgasbord of originalist options frees them to rule as they like and 
justify their decision based on the originalist method that leads to 
their personal desired result. Worse yet, originalist judges regularly 
use originalist methods when doing so suits their purposes but ignore 
them when it does not.310 Political scientists who have researched the 
 
 305 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). Ilan Wurman labels Barnett’s position “Libertarian 
Originalism” and argues that “Richard Epstein takes essentially the same view of 
constitutional legitimacy as Barnett.” Ilan Wurman, The Original Understanding of 
Constitutional Legitimacy, 2014 BYU L. REV. 819, 825–26 (2014). 
 306 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 256, at 116. 
 307 Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: 
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 736 (2013). 
 308 Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
1389, 1429 (2013). 
 309 Id. at 1430 (footnotes omitted). 
 310 Scott Lemieux, Antonin Scalia and the Death of Originalism, NEW REPUBLIC  
(Feb. 24, 2016), http://newrepublic.com/article/130408/antonin-scalia-death-originalism 
[http://perma.cc/WQQ2-76GS] (“Before and after Scalia, justices will use history when 
they believe it supports their ex ante conclusions and ignore it when they believe it 
doesn’t.”). 
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Supreme Court regularly assert that the Justices’ personal and 
political values hold more sway over their decisions than precedent, 
text, and other positive law.311 Jamal Greene has argued that “in the 
great battles between Justices Black and Frankfurter and Justices 
Breyer and Scalia, the originalist position has indeed become as 
much ‘rhetoric as decision procedure.’”312 With different originalisms 
as ala carte options, originalism no longer is a unified decision 
procedure, leaving it a mere rhetorical cloak hiding that judges are 
merely following their own personal predilections. 
F. The Challenges of Originalisms 
A great flaw of originalism is that lawyers, judges, and even 
legal scholars are often inadequate or even terrible historians 
and “constitutional discourse is replete with historical assertions 
that are at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers.”313 The 
historical records originalists rely on are distressingly 
incomplete.314 Because the record is “incorrect in some places, 
has gaps in others, and contains tensions in still others,” it may, 
as noted by Lee Strang, cause judges to “misperceive the original 
intent or create a false original intent.”315 
Justice Scalia gave perhaps the best description of the nearly 
impossible challenge an originalist faces in seeking the 
Constitution’s original meaning: 
Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous 
mass of material . . . for example, . . . the records of the ratifying 
debates in all the states. Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation 
of the reliability of that material—many of the reports of the ratifying 
debates, for example, are thought to be quite unreliable. And further 
still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual 
atmosphere of the time— somehow placing out of mind knowledge 
that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, 
attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of 
our day.316 
 
 311 SEGALL, supra note 244, at 156. 
 312 Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 85 (2009). 
 313 Martin S. Flaherty, supra note 140, at 525. 
 314 James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the 
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (“The purpose of this Article is to issue a 
caveat about Convention records, to warn that there are problems with most of them and 
that some have been compromised—perhaps fatally—by the editorial interventions of 
hirelings and partisans. To recover original intent from these records may be an 
impossible hermeneutic assignment.”). 
 315 Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism's Methodological Rigor: 
Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1181, 1192 (2017). 
 316 Scalia, supra note 2, at 856–57. 
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Such effort would be too difficult and time-consuming for 
almost all judges, and would likely lead them to cherry-pick 
meaning from a few favored sources and engage in “law-office 
linguistics.”317 Consulting dictionaries from the Founding Era 
will not resolve ambiguities, because dictionaries, especially old 
ones, are designed to designate “linguistically permissible” 
meanings, not indicate which meanings are most likely to apply 
best to constitutional questions.318 Further, dictionaries define 
words, not phrases and do not provide context. Finding 
dictionaries that exactly capture the meaning of the Founding 
Era is challenging because “dictionaries from the Founding Era 
are often based on Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, which heavily 
relied on earlier sources.”319 
To solve these problems, some argue that a more robust 
method would be to use a massive database of documents of the 
Founding Era and undertake what are termed corpus linguistics 
searches of hundreds of thousands of texts to determine how the 
public would likely have understood the meaning of the 
Constitution’s various terms.320 However, this “Big Data” 
approach can give a false sense of objectivity, as those searching 
the corpus can affect their results, inadvertently or not, by how 
they construct their searches or how they subjectively interpret 
the results of their searches.321 Judges would hard-pressed to 
judge the accuracy of such searches, and so would likely just 
accept whichever results match their personal policy preferences. 
A great challenge for originalists is how to address 
vagueness, ambiguity, or gaps in the Constitution that is not 
resolved by resorting to texts from the Founding Era or teasing 
out the original meaning of the terms. Originalists have proposed 
various strategies, including the use of presumptions, searching 
for liquidation of meaning, and the use of the “Construction 
Zone” to resolve vagueness, ambiguity, or gaps in the 
Constitution. Presumptions can guide judges when they are in 
the “Construction Zone,” a territory posited by some originalists 
as where meaning has run out, and yet courts must still construe 
the terms after they have exhausted their efforts to interpret it 
 
 317 James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the Three Emoluments 
Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of American English from 
1760-1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 187 (2017). 
 318 James C Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New 
Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 20, 22 (2016). 
 319 Id. 
 320 Donald L. Drakeman, Is Corpus Linguistics Better Than Flipping A Coin?, 109 
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 81, 82 (2020). 
 321 Id. at 85. 
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and decide a case.322 Others argue that there is no real 
“Construction Zone,” and that construction is just an aspect of 
interpretation.323  
The original originalists argued for judicial restraint and a 
presumption of constitutionality324 and Bork stated that courts 
should defer to the legislature’s value judgment “unless it clearly 
runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the 
Constitution”325 and that democracy is impossible without such 
judicial restraint.326 Originalists have increasingly rejected the 
presumption of constitutionality and the judicial restraint it 
provides.327 Randy Barnett, for example, argues instead for a 
“general Presumption of Liberty,” based on the Ninth 
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, “which 
places the burden on the government to establish the necessity 
and propriety of any infringement on individual freedom.”328 
Rather than being presumed constitutional, legislation that 
restricts individual liberty would be presumed unconstitutional 
unless the government can “show why its interference with 
liberty is both necessary and proper . . . .”329 Such a shift in 
presumptions would transform originalism from a system of 
judicial restraint to one of judicial activism. It would transform 
the Supreme Court into a Council of Revision, enforcing 
deregulation policy by casting out legislation libertarians and 
anti-regulation Conservatives that disagree with and so strike 
against the administrative state. Originalists are torn between 
two contradictory forms of originalism, and the “central 
challenge . . . is over who is right: Professor Barnett, who claims 
that originalism leads to judicial activism on behalf of a 
 
 322 Amul R. Thapar & Joe Masterman, Fidelity and Construction, 129 YALE L.J. 774, 
795 (2020). 
 323 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 271, at 14 (“First, some critics have simply denied 
the distinction exists. This was the tack taken by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner in 
their 2012 book Reading Law. In that volume, Scalia and Garner contended that the 
interpretation-construction distinction was based on a linguistic misunderstanding.”).  
 324 Lino A. Graglia, ‘‘Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1019, 1044 (1992) (arguing that “originalism should be understood as requiring a strong 
presumption of constitutionality.”). 
 325 Bork, supra note 250, at 10–11. 
 326 Id. (“If the judiciary really is supreme, able to rule when and as it sees fit, the 
society is not democrat.”). 
 327 Amy Coney Barrett, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 
4, 81 (2017) (“Originalists have refined their arguments in the intervening years, 
however, and they have abandoned the claim that one should be an originalist because 
originalism produces more restrained judges. Originalism has shifted from being a theory 
about how judges should decide cases to a theory about what counts as valid, enforceable 
law.”). 
 328 BARNETT, supra note 305, at 262. 
 329 Id. 
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libertarian state, or Justice Scalia and Judge Bork, who claim 
that originalism leads to judicial restraint.”330 
Other originalists mix these methods, arguing that a 
presumption of liberty should apply when considering federal 
acts, while a presumption of constitutionality should apply to 
state acts, based on the idea that the Constitution grants the 
federal government enumerated, and hence limited powers, while 
the states retain plenary police powers.331 Still other originalists 
argue there should be no such widespread presumptions, as the 
original interpretive conventions answer most constitutional 
questions without needing presumptions.332 This widespread 
disagreement about whether any of these presumptions should 
be applied and, if so, which, indicates that originalism provides 
judges with broad latitude to have their originalist 
interpretations of the Constitution be guided by their personal 
preferences.  
The theory of liquidation is the idea that the founders 
anticipated that judges or other government officials could 
determine meaning after the Ratification and “settle practically 
underdeterminate new law by adopting one permissible 
interpretation rather than another.”333 Liquidation should only be 
applied, according to this theory, if the original meaning is 
unsettled with multiple possible meanings, hence 
“underdeterminate,” and the result “must be within the range of 
permissible preliquidation underdeterminacy that exists after 
application of other appropriate interpretive conventions.”334 
Originalists find an argument for liquidation in statements by both 
Hamilton335 and Madison.336 Philip Hamburger noted, “Although 
 
 330 Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial 
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2005). 
 331 See ILAN WURMAN, A DEBT AGAINST THE LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ORIGINALISM 61 (2017) (citing Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411, 423–28 (1996). 
 332 Id. 
 333 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 
142 (2016). 
 334 Id. 
 335 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 1, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The erection 
of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to 
originate questions of intricacy and nicety; . . . Time only can mature and perfect so 
compound a system, liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and adjust them to each other 
in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.”). 
 336 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 1, at 236 (James Madison) (“All new laws, 
though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most 
mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their 
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and 
adjudications.”). 
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only Madison and Hamilton appear to have descanted on the 
liquidation of meaning, other Federalists also argued that 
interpretation would resolve difficulties.”337 Other originalists, 
however, oppose the idea that liquidation can fix the original 
meaning of the Constitution. For example, Gary Lawson stated, 
“Past precedents do not ‘fix’ or ‘liquidate’ (to use the in-vogue 
Madisonian term) the Constitution’s communicative meaning.”338 
Whether new “original meaning” could be created after the 
Constitution was ratified is a burning issue regarding the 
nondelegation doctrine. Because that doctrine is absent from the 
Constitution, any rules regarding how it is to be applied would 
have to be constructed by the current court either out of whole 
cloth or based on post-Ratification actions either by Congress or 
the courts. A new robust nondelegation would not be the result of 
settling indeterminate meaning in the Constitution, however, but 
rather would be the Court inserting what it thinks the 
Constitution should have mandated but fails to do in any 
recognizable manner.  
Originalism has been criticized for having a significant race 
and gender problem, given that the Constitution was drafted and 
ratified by white men at a time when slavery was legal and women 
were denied the vote. Some have argued that originalism was 
redeemed from this taint by the end of slavery and the passage of 
constitutional amendments that largely rectified, though many 
think did not fully correct, the original errors in the Constitution.339 
Those making this claim must wrestle with the failure of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, however, a topic often ignored.340 The 
narrative of originalism as restoring the original ideals, intent, and 
meaning of the Constitution and its amendments is difficult to 
reconcile with the struggles of the Civil Rights era. Jamal Greene 
stated, “For me, as an African-American, a narrative of restoration 
is deeply alienating; what America has been is hostile to my 
personhood and denies my membership in its political community. 
The only way I can call this Constitution my own is to view it 
through a lens of redemption, the lens that originalism rejects.”341 
 
 337 Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 
Mich. L. Rev. 239, 310 (1989). 
 338 Lawson, supra note 26, at 41. 
 339 See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 256, at 106–12. 
 340 Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 980–82 (2012) 
(“[T]he Reconstruction Era is painful and embarrassing to—and therefore best forgotten by—
many of those whose cultural and political commitments lead them to originalism.”). 
 341 Jamal Greene, Originalism's Race Problem, 88 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 517, 521 
(2011) (emphasis omitted). 
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IV. ORIGINALISM AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE DEBATE  
A. Judicial Originalism and the Nondelegation Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has only fitfully applied originalism to 
decide nondelegation questions and, most notably and 
thoroughly, only in dissents and concurrences. Doing so would be 
a supremely challenging task, given the back-breaking challenge 
to conduct sufficient historical research to accomplish the task. 
Robert Pushaw noted that “originalism requires a historian’s 
expertise and a vast amount of time—two resources that most 
lawyers and all the Justices lack.”342 Even Justice Scalia, one of 
the Court’s great originalists, agreed, noting that the Court 
typically decides cases the same Term they are argued, giving 
Justices only a few months to engage in any necessary historical 
research and querying “Do you have any doubt that this system 
does not present the ideal environment for entirely accurate 
historical inquiry? Nor, speaking for myself at least, does it 
employ the ideal personnel.”343  
Justice Rehnquist conducted a minimalist originalist 
analysis of the nondelegation doctrine in his concurrence in the 
1980 case American Petroleum Institute, regarding regulations 
designed to address occupational exposure to benzene.344 The 
concurrence cites Locke for the proposition that “the legislative 
can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and 
place it in other hands.”345 However, Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurrence does not indicate that Locke’s nondelegation ideas 
influenced the Framers. It then cites Madison for the idea that 
while a division of powers among the branches is a useful 
principle, ““the degree of separation which the maxim requires, 
as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly 
maintained.”346 This seems to undercut Locke’s argument. 
Rehnquist then stated, “It is the hard choices, and not the filling 
in of the blanks, which must be made by the elected 
 
 342 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Comparing Literary and Biblical Hermeneutics to 
Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 463, 482 (2020) 
(“Consequently, the Court typically cobbles together historical tidbits provided in 
attorneys' briefs to justify a result—so-called ‘law office history.’”). 
 343 Scalia, supra note 2, at 861. 
 344 Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–86 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 345 Id. at 672–73 (“In his Second Treatise of Civil Government, published in 1690, 
John Locke wrote that ‘[t]he power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a 
positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant 
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can 
have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.’”). 
 346 Id. at 673. 
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representatives of the people.”347 For this proposition, which is 
the central point of the concurrence, Justice Rehnquist offers no 
authority.  
Rehnquist addressed nondelegation again the next year in a 
case involving whether Congress could delegate to the Secretary 
of Labor, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, the setting of cotton dust standards to protect 
workers from unhealthy working conditions without explicitly 
requiring a cost-benefit analysis.348 Justice Rehnquist agreed 
that some delegation is permissible but would have held this 
delegation unconstitutional.349 Justice Rehnquist’s reasons for 
doing so show why a more robust nondelegation doctrine would 
allow the Court to throw out legislation it disagreed with for the 
most nit-picky of reasons. Justice Rehnquist agreed that 
Congress could have constitutionally delegated the decision “to 
set exposure standards without regard to any kind of cost-benefit 
analysis.”350 However, because Congress did not expressly 
require, prohibit, or permit a cost-benefit analysis, Rehnquist 
thought delegating the decision on how to make a decision was 
unconstitutional.351 “Require, prohibit, or permit” is the 
legislative equivalent to “yes, no, or maybe.” Permitting but not 
requiring a cost-benefit analysis would allow the agency to decide 
whether to do so, which appears to the be result of the vague 
language Congress chose, which does not direct any such choice. 
It is unclear why Justice Rehnquist thought that granting the 
agency discretion with one set of words was constitutional, while 
using another set of words granting same discretion was not. 
Justice Rehnquist would have thrown out the legislation not 
because of the type or amount of power and/or discretion it 
delegated, but rather because he did not like the specific terms 
Congress used to delegate that discretion. 
Justice Scalia, despite being a noted originalist who 
addressed nondelegation on several occasions, was a staunch 
defender of the nondelegation doctrine.352 He did not base his 
nondelegation opinions on an originalist analysis, perhaps in 
 
 347 Id. at 687.  
 348 Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 493 (1981). 
 349 Id. at 547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I do not mean to suggest that Congress, in 
enacting a statute, must resolve all ambiguities or must ‘fill in all of the blanks.”). 
 350 Id. at 545. 
 351 Id. at 547. 
 352 Kelley, supra note 241, at 2108 (“The Supreme Court has had no fiercer defender 
of the nondelegation principle than Justice Antonin Scalia, and no more deferential 
implementer of that principle when it came to applying it in real cases.”). 
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recognition that the Constitution was silent on the subject.353 As 
a law professor, Justice Scalia noted that the nondelegation 
doctrine is a self-contradictory protection of the separation of 
powers, as it would transfer legislative power not to agencies but 
instead to the courts.354 Worse yet, while Congress may have 
some control over agencies by passing new legislation or using 
other leverage, Congress has no power over the Court to alter the 
Court’s decisions. A robust nondelegation doctrine would thus 
significantly weaken Congress under the guise of protecting it 
and give the Court the power to interfere in Congress’s policy 
decisions. Then-Professor Scalia asserted that nondelegation 
should not generally be considered a justiciable issue and so, 
“except perhaps in extreme cases,” should not be enforced by the 
Court, requiring the sorts of judgments “much more appropriate 
for a representative assembly than for a hermetically sealed 
committee of nine lawyers.”355 As Calabresi and Lawson noted, 
“Because it is impossible to formulate the nondelegation doctrine 
in a fashion that does not leave considerable room for judicial 
discretion, it is not surprising that Justice Scalia effectively 
declared it nonjusticiable.”356 
In 1986, then-Judge Scalia joined a per curiam opinion of the 
three-judge court which addressed the constitutionality of 
delegation in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.357 That opinion 
did not challenge the laxity of enforcement of the nondelegation 
doctrine,358 and further rejected the idea that there are “core 
functions” of the legislative power that cannot be delegated.359 
How such “core functions” differ from Justice Rehnquist’s 
“quintessential legislative” choices is unclear, but it seems clear 
that Judge Scalia was not following Justice Rehnquist’s lead on 
nondelegation.  
 
 353 Id. at 2119 (“It is indeed conspicuously absent in Justice Scalia's nondelegation 
jurisprudence that he never took the occasion independently to consider the original 
meaning of the nondelegation doctrine.”). 
 354 See Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, 4 REGUL. 25, 28 (1980) (“[T]o a 
large extent judicial invocation of the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is a self-
denying ordinance–forbidding the transfer of legislative power not to the agencies, but to 
the courts themselves.”). 
 355 Id. 
 356 Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 483, 486 (2014). 
 357 Synar v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 1374, 1383–85 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub. nom. 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 358 Id. at 1384. 
 359 Id. at 1385 (“We reject this ‘core functions’ argument for several reasons. First, 
plaintiffs cite no case in which the Supreme Court has held any legislative power, much 
less that over appropriations, to be nondelegable due to its ‘core function’ status.”). 
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In the 1989 case, Mistretta v. United States, involving the 
delegation to a Sentencing Commission of the power to determine 
appropriate sentences, Justice Scalia, in his dissent, based his 
defense of congressional delegation on nonjusticiability, stating 
that while the nondelegation doctrine is “a fundamental element 
of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily 
enforceable by the courts” and that because no law can be 
completely precise and therefore some policy judgments must be 
“left to the officers executing the law and the judges applying it, 
the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not 
over a point of principle but over a question of degree. . . .”, 
explaining why the Court has “almost never felt qualified to 
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy 
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the 
law.”360 Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta “reflects what might 
be the most deferential approach to the nondelegation doctrine in 
the whole United States Reports.”361 Justice Scalia did object, 
however, to delegation of the legislative power to determine 
appropriate sentences to an independent commission that 
performed no executive function and so the delegation was not 
ancillary to any Executive power.362 
In Whitman v. American Trucking Association,363 Justice 
Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, repeated his assertion 
that the Court has “almost never felt qualified to second-guess 
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment” 
Congress can delegate to agencies.364 His opinion discussed 
limitations of the nondelegation doctrine, stating “It is true 
enough that the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable 
varies according to the scope of the power congressionally 
conferred.”365 However, his discussion of the nondelegation 
doctrine and its limitations is based on Supreme Court precedent 
from the last century and not on originalist sources.366  
Other Justices have recently fired originalist shots across the 
bow at congressional delegations in various concurring or 
dissenting opinions, with Justice Thomas firing the first shot in 
 
 360 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 361 Kelley, supra note 241, at 2116. 
 362 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The lawmaking function of the 
Sentencing Commission is completely divorced from any responsibility for execution of the 
law or adjudication of private rights under the law.”). 
 363 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 364 Id. at 474 (quoting his own dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 365 Id. at 475. 
 366 Id. at 472–76. 
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2001, writing separately in American Trucking Association to say 
that “[o]n a future day . . . I would be willing to address the 
question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too 
far from our Founders’ understanding of separation of powers.”367 
Justices Thomas368 and Gorsuch have led the charge. They now 
may be joined by Justices Kavanaugh369 and Alito.370 Justice 
Thomas’s originalist discussion of nondelegation has been the 
most lengthy. Some argue that Justice Thomas’s originalism 
seems driven by his policy preferences, including the argument 
that “. . . Justice Thomas’ frequent resort to history is almost 
certainly a function of his Federalist Society political and 
jurisprudential views . . . .”371 He has been clear as to what he 
considers the source of the nondelegation doctrine, stating, “I 
locate that principle in the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and 
III—not in the Due Process Clause.”372  
In his concurrence in Association of American Railroads, 
Justice Thomas laid out an extended history of the nondelegation 
doctrine and its roots, tracing its origins to Greek and Roman law 
and the concept of the rule of law, with stops at Bracton, Locke, 
and Blackstone.373 He recounts the power of English kings to 
issue royal proclamations and King Henry VIII prevailing on 
Parliament to pass the Act of Proclamations in 1539, giving his 
proclamations the force and effect of an Act of Parliament. By 
basing much of the discussion on the English history and 
multiple citations of one of his own previous concurring opinions, 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence perhaps indicates how little 
 
 367 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 368 See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2216 (2020) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Constitution does not permit the creation of officers 
exercising ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasi-judicial powers’ in ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasi-
judicial agencies.’ No such powers or agencies exist. Congress lacks the authority to 
delegate its legislative power . . . Nor can Congress create agencies that straddle multiple 
branches of Government.” (citations omitted)). 
 369 See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“I write 
separately because Justice GORSUCH's scholarly analysis of the Constitution's nondelegation 
doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases . . . Like 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion 40 years ago, Justice GORSUCH's thoughtful Gundy opinion 
raised important points that may warrant further consideration in future cases.”). 
 370 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 371 Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses 
of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 884–85 (1997). 
 372 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch concurred in Dimaya, also on originalist grounds but 
finding they led him to a different conclusion than Justice Thomas’s conclusion. 
 373 Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 70–74, 86 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“We should return to the original meaning of the Constitution: The 
Government may create generally applicable rules of private conduct only through the 
proper exercise of legislative power. I accept that this would inhibit the Government from 
acting with the speed and efficiency Congress has sometimes found desirable.”). 
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evidence there is of original intent at the Founding. The 
concurrence does cite to Madison regarding the importance of 
keeping the powers separate, but also as to the difficulty of doing 
so, in that “classifying governmental power is an elusive 
venture.”374 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence was the most extensive 
attempt by an originalist Justice to justify the nondelegation 
doctrine and seems a failure as an originalist project. The 
concurrence points to no direct statements by framers or ratifiers 
or other evidence sufficient to prove that, as a group, they 
intended that the nondelegation doctrine be part of the 
Constitution, nor does it point to any original meaning of words 
in the Constitution that would mandate or indicate a bar on 
delegation. Moreover, the concurrence ignores that the 
nondelegation doctrine and the related non-encroachment 
doctrine were rejected when they were proposed for the 
Constitution or the Bill of Rights, respectively.  
The concurrence ignores the fact that, during the 
Constitutional Convention, the framers refused to give the 
judiciary the kind of policy-making power that the nondelegation 
doctrine would hand today’s Court. The concurrence does not 
seem to involve an even-handed attempt to conduct the kind of 
deep and difficult historical analysis Justice Scalia asserted 
originalism requires or to discern the intent of the framers. While 
quoting Locke and claiming his influence, the concurrence 
displays no apparent research to determine whether the framers 
or ratifiers were at all influenced by Locke or his nondelegation 
dictum while crafting and ratifying the Constitution. Instead, it 
appears to be an effort to turn thin, tenuous evidence into an 
argument to gain the policy result Justice Thomas prefers. The 
other originalists on the court, Justices Scalia and Alito, did not 
join the concurrence, possibly because they thought it went too 
far.375 
Justice Gorsuch announced the libertarian motive 
underlying his dissent in Gundy with the first line: “The 
Constitution promises that only the people’s elected 
representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting 
liberty.”376 Article I vests all legislative power in Congress,377 but 
 
 374 Sessions, 138 S. Ct. at 1245–46. 
 375 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of 
Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 63 (“[I]t is significant that neither Justice 
Scalia nor Justice Alito joined Justice Thomas's concurrence in the judgment, with its 
startlingly broad criticism of nondelegation.”). 
 376 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019). 
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does not single out those “restricting liberty.”378 Justice Gorsuch 
quickly runs into the limits of the almost nonexistent evidence of 
a nondelegation doctrine at the Founding. His dissent reads like 
an originalist’s greatest hits of asserting what the Framers of the 
Constitution collectively believed,379 knew,380 insisted,381 or 
understood,382 all without proof of any such collective intent or 
understanding. The dissent states, “The framers understood, 
too”, that it would frustrate “the system of government ordained 
by the Constitution” if Congress could merely announce vague 
aspirations and then assign others the responsibility of adopting 
legislation to realize its goals.383 However, to make this 
argument, Justice Gorsuch cites Marshall Field & Co., from 
1892, which is hardly good evidence of what the Framers 
understood.384 Justice Gorsuch asserts that the Framers 
“believed the new federal government’s most dangerous power 
was the power to enact laws restricting the people’s liberty.”385 
This proposition about the collective Framers’ belief would be 
impossible to prove, goes against common current originalist 
rejection of the Framers’ intent as the basis for an originalist 
understanding of the meaning of the Constitution, and is based 
on the writing of only one of the Framers, James Madison.386  
Justice Gorsuch asserts that if Congress can delegate its 
legislative powers “to the executive branch, the ‘[v]esting 
[c]lauses, and indeed the entire structure of the Constitution,’ 
would ‘make no sense.’”387 In making this assertion, Justice 
Gorsuch cites noted libertarian law professor Gary Larson, again 
showing Justice Gorsuch’s libertarian agenda not anchored in 
original sources.388 Importing modern policy concerns into the 
Constitution through judicial interpretation is the very thing 
that originalism was originally designed to prevent. As Raoul 
Berger noted, “A common historicist fallacy is to import our 
twentieth-century conceptions into the minds of the Founders.”389  
 
 377 U.S. CONST. art I. 
 378 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2116. 
 379 Id. (“the framers believed,”). 
 380 Id. (“[t]he framers knew, too,”). 
 381 Id. (“the framers insisted,”). 
 382 Id. (“The framers understood, too”). 
 383 Id. 
 384 Id. at 2133 (citing Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). 
 385 Id. at 2134. 
 386 Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309–12 (James Madison)). 
 387 Id. at 2134–35 (citing Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 327, 340 (2002)). 
 388 Id. 
 389 BERGER, supra note 6, at 306. 
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Justice Gorsuch boldly claims further knowledge of the 
Framers’ understanding: “The framers knew, too, that the job of 
keeping the legislative power confined to the legislative branch 
couldn’t be trusted to self-policing by Congress; often enough, 
legislators will face rational incentives to pass problems to the 
executive branch.”390 Justice Gorsuch provides absolutely no basis 
for this claim, which goes to the heart of whether the 
nondelegation doctrine even exists as a constitutional mandate391 
and which contradicts Madison’s statement in Federalist 51 that 
the great security in preserving the separation of powers lies in 
the self-interest and ambition of the members of each branch. The 
dissent fails to mention that the Framers and the First Congress 
both rejected adding nondelegation or a similar non-encroachment 
doctrine to the Constitution.  
Bork condemned judges inserting their own policy 
preferences into the Constitution based on claims that they “are 
supported, indeed compelled, by a proper understanding of the 
Constitution of the United States. Value choices are attributed to 
the Founding Fathers, not to the Court.”392 However, the dissent 
points to no convincing evidence that the framers shared the 
policy preferences that the nondelegation doctrine would achieve. 
As Mortenson and Bagley note, “None of the sources [in the 
dissent] address whether the Founders believed that a law 
passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President 
was unconstitutional if it delegated too much authority or 
authority of the wrong kind.”393 
Justice Gorsuch then proceeds to construct his own test for 
impermissible delegation, even though he acknowledges that at 
least one of the Framers noted the difficulty of doing so, stating that 
“Madison acknowledged that ‘no skill in the science of government 
has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient 
certainty, its three great provinces—the legislative, executive, and 
judiciary.’”394 Justice Gorsuch cobbles together his proposed test 
from various Court decisions. From the 1825 case, Wayman  
v. Southard, Justice Gorsuch gleaned the following rule: “First, we 
know that as long as Congress makes the policy decisions when 
regulating private conduct, it may authorize another branch to ‘fill 
up the details.’”395 From cases starting in 1813, Justice Gorsuch 
 
 390 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019). 
 391 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
 392 Bork, supra note 325, passim. 
 393 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
 394 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 227 (James Madison)). 
 395 Id. at 2136 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 31, 43 (1825)). 
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concluded: “Second, once Congress prescribes the rule governing 
private conduct, it may make the application of that rule depend on 
executive fact-finding.”396 And as a last part of the test for 
permissible delegation Justice Gorsuch added: “Third, Congress may 
assign the executive and judicial branches certain non-legislative 
responsibilities.”397 This part of the test is intended to deal with 
occasions where Congress’s legislative authority “overlaps with 
authority the Constitution separately vests in another branch.”398 
In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch condemns what he calls the 
“mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’ remark” as having 
“no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution in history, 
or even in the decision from which it was plucked.”399 However, 
he would replace more than a century of what he labels “the 
intelligible principle misadventure”400 with his own brand-new 
nondelegation test with no foundation in the original meaning of 
the Constitution and cobbled together from such sources as his 
reading of older Supreme Court cases on nondelegation. Justice 
Gorsuch would judicially amend the Constitution not only to 
include a nondelegation doctrine, but also one with the specific 
terms that he himself has newly created. The first originalists 
would likely look on such judicial activism with dismay. 
Justice Gorsuch might argue that he would not change the 
meaning of the Constitution with his new rules on nondelegation, 
but rather merely its application. He has written, “Originalism 
teaches only that the Constitution’s original meaning is fixed; 
meanwhile, of course, new applications of that meaning will arise 
with new developments and new technologies.”401 However, his 
creation of his own nondelegation test gets that statement exactly 
backwards. Justice Gorsuch would base a new meaning of the 
Constitution on the old judicial applications. Justice Gorsuch might 
assert that Supreme Court decisions well after the Founding have 
liquidated the meaning of the nondelegation doctrine. However, it is 
contradictory to assert as Justice Gorsuch said that “the 
Constitution’s meaning was fixed at its ratification. . .”402 and that 
court decisions decades or even centuries later can fix the original 
meaning of the Constitution where it is vague. 
 
 396 Id. at 2136–37 (citing Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
382, 388 (1813) and Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U.S. 385, 393 (1883)). 
 397 Id. at 2137. 
 398 Id. 
 399 Id. 
 400 Id. at 2141. 
 401 NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 111 (2019). 
 402 Id. at 110. 
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While these Justices have cast their nondelegation discussions in 
originalist terms, it is difficult to determine what form of originalism 
they appear to be following. They do not specify what sources they 
view as trustworthy to determine the original meaning. They do not 
discuss the original meaning of the word “vest” and what that 
meaning says about the permissibility of legislative delegation. 
Instead, they too often engage in a primitive and discredited form of 
originalism in which they merely cherry-pick statements of Locke 
and their favored Founding Era sources and announce what the 
Founders understood. 
Bork noted that originalism requires courts to stay their 
hands for “entire ranges of problems and issues” as courts “will 
say of particular controversies that no provision of the 
Constitution reaches the issues presented, and the controversies 
are therefore not for judges to resolve.”403 Here, there is no 
provision that contains a nondelegation doctrine or determines 
when it should apply. Therefore, under the original originalist 
approach, originalist judges should stay their hand.  
B. The Academic Debate over Originalists’ Claims of 
Nondelegation at the Founding 
Legal scholars have also extensively analyzed an originalist 
approach to the nondelegation conundrum, with a fierce debate 
among academics as to whether Congress delegating rule-making 
authority was considered constitutional at the Founding, and if 
so, how much, when, and why. In the course of this debate, 
academics have recently unearthed a trove of new evidence about 
legislative delegation at the Founding. 
Posner and Vermeule fired the first salvo in 2002 with an 
article arguing against the nondelegation doctrine by listing a 
number of early statutes that provide for delegation of discretionary 
rule-making power to the Executive Branch, including statutes 
regarding military pensions,404 trade with Indian tribes,405 
patents,406 acquiring land on the Potomac for the Capitol,407 giving 
the mitigating or remitting fines and forfeitures,408 and paying 
 
 403 BORK, supra note 292, at 163. 
 404 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 95. See also Act of March 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 218 (reauthorizing 
pensions “under such regulations as the President of the United States may direct”). 
 405 Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137, 137. 
 406 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109, 110. 
 407 Act of July 16, 1790, 1 Stat. 130, 130. 
 408 See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 
719 (1969) (citing Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122, 123). 
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wounded or disabled military.409 The argument is that if such laws 
were passed in America’s infancy, clearly the Founding generation 
did not think delegating legislative power was a problem. In 
discussing such Federalist-era delegations, Jerry Mashaw 
exclaimed, “[s]ome of these delegations were so broad that one 
might wonder whether a twenty-first-century court would be able to 
find any standards guiding the exercise of administrative 
authority.”410  
These statutes, along with numerous others added by 
various researchers,411 have become a battleground on which 
originalists’ claims of nondelegation at the Founding have been 
fought. New evidence of delegation at the Founding has been 
discovered by Chabot and Parrillo. Chabot uncovered previously 
overlooked evidence of delegation debates in a 1790 act on 
handling the public debt412 which gave members of the Executive 
Branch broad discretion to buy national debt413 despite the fact 
that such policy decisions “had enormous implications for the 
national economy and private creditors” and could “jeopardize 
the United States’ ability to obtain future credit.”414 Chabot notes 
that while Congress repeatedly delegating broad powers, there 
was discussion of limiting the amount to be borrowed and there 
were “no records of qualified objections suggesting that Congress 
could not delegate power to resolve important questions.”415 
Parrillo analyzed The Direct Tax Legislation of 1798 and 
found that it contained extensive delegation of rulemaking power 
that affected private property and was enacted without 
constitutional objection.416 The legislation provided federal 
boards in each of the state’s vast discretionary powers and, 
Parrillo argues, “left the principles and methods of valuation 
open and allowed the federal boards in the individual states to 
fill the gap.”417 Whittington and Iuliano extended the history of 
delegation into the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
finding only rare invalidation of legislation on a nondelegation 
basis in state courts and almost none in federal courts.418 
 
 409 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 11, 1 Stat. 119, 121. 
 410 Mashaw, supra note 122, at 1339–40. 
 411 See Nicholas R. Parrillo, supra note 142 (manuscript at 14–16). See also 
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 332–66. 
 412 Parrillo, supra note 142 (manuscript at 31) (citing Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 186).  
 413 Id. (citing Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 186 §§ 1–2). 
 414 Id. (manuscript at 32). 
 415 Id. (manuscript at 35). 
 416 See generally id.  
 417 Id. (manuscript at 54). 
 418 See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 221, at 379.  
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Jennifer Mascott, in an article about early customs law, 
provides a useful window into how Congress and the Executive 
Branch maintained the separation of Legislative and Executive 
powers in practice immediately following the Founding, showing 
they could do so without the judicial maintenance of a 
constitutional bar on delegation.419 After extensively scouring the 
debates over early customs law and the establishment of the 
Department of the Treasury for evidence of discussion on 
delegation, Mascott does not mention any instance where any 
member claimed that the Constitution limited Congress’s power to 
delegate its legislative powers. Instead, what she reports is 
members scrupulously protecting the power of the House, which 
would render a court-enforced nondelegation doctrine 
unnecessary.420 
Originalist defenders of nondelegation often deal with these 
early statutes with the claim that they include a smaller 
delegation of legislative power than Congress might have 
made,421 are simply examples of Congress inconsistently 
following the nondelegation doctrine,422 or constitute exceptions 
to that doctrine.423 And from Congress’s early delegations, some 
would construct a rule limiting Congress now to delegating 
legislative power only in the same ways it did in its early 
existence. It is difficult to justify a claim that somehow the 
Constitution prohibits Congress from making any delegations 
now that are not similar to delegations it made in the early years 
of the Republic, especially given how dramatically changed the 
country and its government are. Holding today’s Congress to the 
delegations it made in its early years is an odd form of estoppel, 
that by delegating only in the manner it deemed necessary at the 
 
 419 See Jennifer Mascott, Early Customs Laws and Delegation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1388, 1394 (2019).  
 420 Id. at 1441 (citing DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (4 Mar. 1789–3 Mar. 1791), reprinted in 10 DEBATES IN 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES lxi, lxi–lxiv (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) 
at 756). While one member stated that he took improving the revenue “to be the peculiar 
business of the federal legislature,” in the end, the House voted to empower the Secretary 
of Treasury to “digest and prepare plans for the improvement and management of the 
revenue.” Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65.  
 421 See Wurman, supra note 66, at 23–24. 
 422 See id. at 23. 
 423 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line 
Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton 
v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 271–72 (2001) (“I argue that the nondelegation 
doctrine probably does not apply to various matters. . . . Thus, the formalist nondelegation 
doctrine can explain the exceptions for foreign and military affairs, some of the early 
delegations and traditional practices that appear to assume the constitutionality of 
delegations, such as annual appropriations and the conferral of military discretion.”). 
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beginning of the Republic, Congress should now be 
constitutionally estopped from delegating in any other manner. 
Estoppel, however, is typically not applied against the United 
States, as “the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to 
the rule of law is undermined.”424 
Those attacking the idea of nondelegation at the Founding 
have employed more theoretical tools in addition to pointing out 
all of the times Congress in its first years delegated its legislative 
power. Posner and Vermeule claim that any bar on delegation 
was strikingly limited: “Neither Congress nor its members may 
delegate to anyone else the authority to vote on federal statutes 
or to exercise other de jure powers of federal legislators.”425 In 
other words, Congress may delegate legislative powers so long as 
it does not allow federal agencies to vote on federal statutes. This 
is akin to the idea, expressed by Madison in Federalist 47, that a 
legislature cannot delegate its whole power of legislation, though 
it may give what Madison called a “partial agency” and so gain 
control through a more limited legislative delegation. Hence no 
delegation of legislative power to agencies is barred unless 
Congress allows them to act as legislators. Posner and Vermeule 
build their argument on earlier work by Harold J. Krent426 and 
Kenneth Culp Davis.427 Posner and Vermeule’s article was 
criticized by Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, who 
dispute this view of delegation, though do not seek to prove that 
the conventional nondelegation doctrine is enshrined in the 
Constitution.428 They argued, instead, that the legislative power 
at issue in the nondelegation doctrine is much broader than just 
the power to vote on legislation or act as a member of Congress. 
As noted by Mortenson and Bagley, Alexander and Prakash’s 
“evidence was heavy on citations to theorists like Locke, 
Montesquieu, and Blackstone, but light on concrete evidence 
from the Founding.”429 
 
 424 Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984). 
 425 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1723.  
 426 Id. at 1735 n.51; see also Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 710, 738–39 (1994) (gathering early statutes that provide for delegation 
by Congress and noting “[i]n addition, the early history of the republic furnishes scant 
support for vigorous enforcement of a nondelegation doctrine.”). 
 427 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1735 n.51; see also Davis, supra note 408, at 
719–20 (1969) (“Not only is delegation without meaningful standards a necessity for 
today's governments at all levels but such delegation has been deemed a necessity from 
the time the United States was founded, as anyone can quickly confirm by examining the 
statutes enacted by the 1st Congress, which was made up largely of the same men who 
wrote the Constitution.”).  
 428 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 132, at 1328.  
 429 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 285.  
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Mortenson and Bagley argued that Legislative and 
Executive power was defined much differently in the Founding 
Era, and what we would consider a delegation of legislative 
power to federal agencies would not have been considered that 
back then.430 Mortenson and Bagley assert that legislative power 
was defined more broadly and simply at the Founding and was, 
as Montesquieu explained, “no more than the general will of the 
state.”431 They also state that Executive power was defined much 
more thinly then, simply as “the narrow but potent authority to 
carry out projects defined by a prior exercise of the legislative 
power.”432 In other words, the ability to create rules that 
governed private behavior could be part of the legislative power if 
it were done in the creation of a plan or policy and also part of 
the Executive power if it were used at the direction of Congress 
to carry out legislative instructions.433 Any particular act can be 
either legislative, if it is done in the creation of a plan or issuing 
instructions to the Executive Branch, or Executive, if it is done 
by the Executive Branch to implement those instructions, 
Mortenson and Bagley argued.434 
To make their case, originalist defenders of the 
nondelegation doctrine should present convincing evidence from 
the Founding that nondelegation was widely discussed and that 
the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution understood that it 
included the doctrine, at least implicitly. To the extent that 
originalists depend on Locke’s Second Treatise as justification for 
nondelegation, they should acknowledge and address the 
historians’ accounts of how Locke’s influence plummeted as soon 
as the Revolutionary War started, and that Locke’s influence in 
America after that has been discounted generally by those who 
have studied it. And if they value the original meaning of the 
Constitution’s terms, they should wrestle with the original 
meaning of the word “vest,” which is crucial to an analysis of 
Congress’s ability to delegate the legislative power with which it 
is vested. Such efforts, however, have not yet been made. 
Also worrisome is the fact that the various originalist 
defenders of the nondelegation doctrine use radically different 
methods of originalism and different bases and evidence for their 
claims of nondelegation at the Founding, even switching 
 
 430 Id. at 294.  
 431 Id. (citing 1 M. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws bk. XI, ch. 
VI, at 201 (London, printed for T. Evans & W. Davis 1777)).  
 432 Id. at 315.  
 433 Id. 
 434 Id. 
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regularly where nondelegation could be found in the 
Constitution. However, one senses a joy from originalists in this 
debate, in that the opponents of nondelegation seem to be taking 
originalist claims and methods seriously to argue in such detail 
over evidence of delegation at the Founding. Wurman seems 
especially happy that Mortenson and Bagley are arguing over the 
doctrine on originalist turf, and hence “at least recognizing that 
originalist work is possible.”435 
Wurman, in his article arguing for nondelegation at the 
Founding, indicates that he is more an original intent originalist 
than an original meaning originalist, stating that “originalists 
usually look to text, structure, intent, and early historical 
practice to ascertain the likely original meaning, or the range of 
plausible meanings, of a particular constitutional provision.”436 
Wurman also asserts “intended meaning is often good evidence of 
the actual textual meaning.”437 He does not in his article attempt 
to discern the original meaning of the Constitution’s words. 
Wurman’s article section on “The Positive Evidence of a 
Nondelegation Doctrine: Explicit Statements and Arguments” is 
stunning on what it omits: any mention of discussion by the 
Framers or ratifiers at the time the Constitution was drafted and 
ratified.438 One would think that if the Constitution embodied the 
nondelegation doctrine as a fundamental principle, the Framers 
and ratifiers would have discussed that at some length. If they 
did not, as Wurman’s silence indicates, that is strong evidence 
that they did not intend the Constitution to contain a 
nondelegation doctrine.439 By comparison, when Wurman 
discusses other related topics such as Institutionalism and the 
Separation of Powers, his text is chock-a-block with references to 
the Federalist, indicating that these topics were in fact widely 
discussed at the Founding.440 Wurman acknowledges that it is 
impossible to conclusively prove nondelegation at the Founding, 
stating “To be sure, the history is a bit messy, precluding any kind 
of categorical conclusion.”441 Instead of discussing evidence from the 
 
 435 Wurman, supra note 66, at 5. 
 436 Id. at 10–11. 
 437 Id. at 9 n.26. 
 438 Id. at 14–29. 
 439 See John Harrison, Judicial Interpretive Finality and the Constitutionality Text, 
23 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 33 (2006) (“Elephants leave traces when they pass by. That is 
true about the Constitution as it is elsewhere . . . . One way to tell whether the 
Constitution adopts a principle is thus to look for its traces, and one way to do that is to 
ask: If the framers had planned to include the principle, or had assumed that other 
decisions they had made entailed the principle, where would it manifest itself?”). 
 440 Wurman, supra note 66, at 3–38.  
 441 Id. at 1. 
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Founding about the intent of the Framers and/or ratifiers or the 
original public meaning of the Constitution when ratified, Wurman 
instead points to “three key episodes”442 as evidence of a 
nondelegation doctrine: (1) debates over a non-encroachment 
amendment as part of the Bill of Rights that did not pass Congress, 
(2) the establishment of the post roads, and (3) the Alien Friends 
Act. He asserts that these debates and events provide evidence of a 
nondelegation doctrine, but instead the non-encroachment 
amendment was rejected and, as demonstrated by Mortenson and 
Bagley, the other debates show that Congress did delegate despite a 
few scattered objections.443 
Aaron Gordon published an originalist defense of 
nondelegation in 2019,444 and responded directly to the Mortenson 
and Bagley article in 2020 with similar arguments. In his 2019 
article, Gordon undercuts the idea that original meaning 
originalism can answer whether the nondelegation doctrine exists. 
He states, “vague language” of the Constitution is “arguably 
susceptible to equally plausible readings both supporting and 
undermining the Nondelegation Doctrine” and so skips “textual 
and syntactic hyper-analysis . . .”445 Gordon forgoes any theoretical 
justification of the original sources he relies on, other than noting 
that original meaning originalism does not lead to any settled 
answer and that other scholars and jurists cite similar 
materials.446 
Gordon presents as evidence of nondelegation at the Founding 
matters discussed previously that do not demonstrate nondelegation 
at the Founding, such as the debunked great influence of Locke on 
the Framers of the Constitution, the pre-Revolutionary Otis 
pamphlet urging Parliament to recognize colonial legislatures and 
Adams’ citing it as an influence on the Revolution, and the 
nondelegation amendment rejected in the Convention. To that, 
Gordon adds (1) nondelegation references in American editions of 
Rutherforth’s Institutes of Natural Law that were published after the 
Constitution was ratified; (2) Hamilton’s discussions in the Federalist 
 
 442 Id. at 26. 
 443 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 282. 
 444 See Gordon, supra note 43, at 718.  
 445 Id. at 733–34. 
 446 Id. at 734–35 (“Historical materials from this period, to the extent they express 
views that were common and mostly uncontested at that time, are generally regarded as 
valid evidence of the Constitution's original meaning, with an ideologically diverse array 
of commentators and jurists routinely citing sources from as late as the 1830s in making 
originalist arguments about constitutional provisions adopted prior to 1800, or sources 
similarly temporally removed from the adoption of whichever provision's meaning is at 
issue.”). 
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about the President’s pardon powers; and (3) Jefferson’s complaints 
that Parliament had let the King decide when two wharves could be 
reopened.447 Tellingly, Jefferson did not claim that such delegation to 
the unelected monarch was not permitted, but rather that if 
Parliament delegated its legislative powers too often to the King, it 
could lead to despotism.448 In other words, Gordon presents no 
convincing evidence that the Framers of the Constitution, who had 
provided for an elected President as Executive, not an unelected 
monarch, intended that the Constitution include a nondelegation 
doctrine. 
Gordon proposes his own version of the nondelegation doctrine, 
what he calls “a historically-grounded judicial test for identifying 
unconstitutional delegations: ‘a statute unconstitutionally delegates 
legislative power when it 1) allows the agent . . . to issue general 
rules governing private conduct that carry the force of law and 2) 
makes the content or effectiveness of those rules dependent upon 
the agent’s policy judgment, rather than upon a factual 
contingency.’”449 Since Gordon is an originalist, one might think 
these rules would be what Gordon thinks the Constitution meant 
when ratified. However, his rules are all drawn from what Congress 
actually did after the Framing. 
Gordon’s 2020–2021 article presents a moving target, as it 
was last updated April 30, 2021. It argues with Mortenson and 
Bagley’s definition of “legislative power,” cites mid-nineteenth 
century treatises on agency450 and argues that because Congress 
was an agent it could not delegate its powers, ignoring cases in 
the nation’s first years indicating that a legislature and 
government officials could delegate some aspect of their 
powers.451 Nonetheless, it adds little additional evidence of 
nondelegation at the Founding. 
A much more ambitious originalist defense of the 
nondelegation doctrine has been mounted by Gary Lawson, 
beginning with an article published about the same time as 
Posner and Vermeule’s and then in a another replying directly to 
their article. In his article, Delegation and Original Meaning, 
Lawson attempts a full originalist defense of the nondelegation 
doctrine and argues for its revival.452 Lawson, to his credit, starts 
 
 447 Id. at 739–41.  
 448 Id. at 741.  
 449 Id. at 781. 
 450 Gordon, supra note 181 (manuscript at 7). 
 451 Id. at 3 (ignoring such cases as Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799) and 
Hunt v. Burrel, 5 Johns. 137 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809)). 
 452 Lawson, supra note 128, at 327. 
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with a blunt admission that “there is nothing in the Constitution 
that specifically states, in precise terms, that no other actor may 
exercise legislative power or that Congress may not authorize 
other actors to exercise legislative power.”453  
Lawson states that the pertinent question is what the 
general public would have understood “if all relevant information 
and arguments had been brought to its attention” and “historical 
sources remain relevant and probative but are inconclusive.”454 
And because documents can have “meanings that are latent in 
their language and structure even if they are not obvious to 
observers at a specific moment in time . . . the role and relevance 
of historical sources is more attenuated.”455 Original meaning 
originalism, then, puts Lawson in a tight box. Unless it can be 
shown that a fully informed public at the time would have 
understood that the Constitution contained a nondelegation 
doctrine, then it does not matter whether some Framers or other 
individuals at the time thought that or acted as if it did. 
A discussion of whether a fully informed public would have 
understood that vesting legislative power in Congress limits its 
delegation should naturally turn on what such a hypothetical public 
would understand is meant by the term “vest.” Instead, Lawson 
relies on his assertion that powers vested cannot be delegated 
unless specifically permitted, ignoring that an informed public 
might well have concluded that “vesting” the legislative power in 
Congress implies that Congress can delegate those powers. 
Lawson searches for possible clauses of the Constitution that 
would permit delegation, stating that a “number of modern 
scholars have indeed invoked [the Sweeping Clause of Article I] 
as a possible constitutional authorization to Congress to confer 
broad discretion on administrators.”456 Lawson notes that the 
Sweeping Clause “requires all executory laws to be both 
‘necessary’ and ‘proper,’ in the conjunctive” and asserts that the 
“term ‘proper’ would have been understood to describe “power 
that is ‘within the peculiar jurisdiction or responsibility of the 
relevant governmental actor.’”457 Delegation of legislative power, 
if otherwise permitted, would clearly be within Congressional 
jurisdiction or responsibility, however. And so, Lawson states the 
 
 453 Id. at 335.  
 454 Id. at 341 n.51. 
 455 Id. 
 456 Id. at 346. 
 457 Id. at 347 (quoting Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of 
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 
291 (1993)).  
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question is whether a “fully informed eighteenth-century 
audience would have viewed a statute purporting to authorize an 
executive agent to make laws as ‘improper’ . . .”458  
Lawson does not provide a full answer that question in this 
article, stating that “it is impossible to give full treatment here to 
the extensive textual, structural, and historical arguments that 
justify this conclusion.”459 Instead, he argues that because of the 
structure of the Constitution, the Sweeping Clause would not be 
understood to permit delegation, as it “incorporates the basic 
constitutional structure; it does not offer a vehicle for 
circumventing it.” Lawson relies on his understanding of the 
Constitution rather than on good evidence of what a hypothetical 
fully informed public would have understood. 
Lawson returned to this issue in 2005 and agreed that 
delegation would be authorized by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause if it matched Madison’s requirement that to be 
“necessary” there must be a definite connection between a law’s 
means and its ends and they must be linked “by some obvious 
and precise affinity.”460 Lawson acknowledged that this would 
provide for legislative delegation so long as Congress shows such 
delegation is connected to Congress’s legislative ends.461 Lawson 
strained to find some additional meaning in the word “proper” to 
hang the nondelegation doctrine on, but largely fails.  
In the end, Lawson was reduced to finding the nondelegation 
doctrine inherent in the structure of the Constitution, not justified 
by any of the express terms thereof or what a fully informed public 
would have understood from specific provisions in the Constitution. 
He states that the Nondelegation Doctrine “is not a principle 
expressly stated in the Constitution, but it is a better inference from 
the overall structure of the Constitution than is the contrary 
principle.”462 And so, Lawson would have us infer the nondelegation 
doctrine not from original meaning but from our current 
understanding of the Constitution. Aaron Gordon, in his originalist 
defense of nondelegation, stated that “a grandiose, abstract case for 
the Nondelegation Doctrine based on arguments from constitutional 
 
 458 Id. at 350. 
 459 Id. at 346. 
 460 Id. at 448. 
 461 Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The Proper Understanding of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 248 (“If Congress wants to vest 
discretion in the President, Congress had better be prepared to show in a direct and 
immediate fashion how the precise scope and character of that discretion is important to 
the execution of federal powers.”). 
 462 Id. at 263. 
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structure and accountability would be worthless unless buttressed 
by a wealth of historical sources. . .” demonstrating that the 
founders would have thought that inappropriate delegation by 
Congress would be unconstitutional.463 Lawson, however, provided 
no such historical sources. 
Post-Gundy, but before the Mortenson and Bagley article, 
Lawson again discussed possible sources for the nondelegation 
doctrine in both a 2017 book with Guy Seidman464 and a 2019 
article about Gundy.465 In his article, Gary Lawson acknowledged 
that he had previously asserted that the nondelegation doctrine 
resided in the Vesting Clauses, and at other times, in the 
Sweeping Clause.466 However, he stated that he had recently 
come to a different conclusion, laid out in both the book and 
article, which will be discussed jointly here, that both of his 
previous lines of argument are “subsumed under and superseded 
by a more fundamental consideration. . . The Constitution is a 
kind of agency, or fiduciary, instrument.”467 And that because the 
different branches of government are fiduciaries with their 
powers delegated to them by the people, they cannot subdelegate 
their authority because there is no express authority to do so in 
the Constitution, nor is there, Lawson claimed, custom or strict 
necessity which could justify such subdelegation.468 Furthermore, 
as agents, the powers of Congress and the Executive Branch 
must be strictly construed.469 And based on this agency analysis, 
Lawson boldly asserted, “The rule against subdelegation of 
legislative authority is among the clearest constitutional rules 
one can imagine.”470  
A fundamental weakness in this argument, which seems a 
constitutional application of the Delegata maxim, is the dearth of 
evidence that the Constitution is essentially an agency or fiduciary 
instrument, or should be construed as such. Even Lawson noted the 
many alternative views as to what the Constitution is most like, 
including a “‘superstatute,’ a ‘compact,’ a ‘treaty,’ a ‘corporate 
charter’” and numerous others.471 Given this wide range of 
 
 463 Gordon, supra note 181 (manuscript at 53). 
 464 See generally GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY” 
UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 1 (2017).  
 465 See generally, e.g., Lawson, supra note 26, at 31; LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 
464, at 1.  
 466 Lawson, supra note 26, at 43. 
 467 Id. 
 468 Id. at 44. 
 469 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 464, at 105.  
 470 Id. at 117. 
 471 Id. at 2 (citations omitted). 
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possibilities, why should we base our interpretation of the 
Constitution on Lawson’s recent understanding that it is an agency 
or fiduciary agreement?  
Lawson and Seidman’s reply is that “the agency-law 
character of the Constitution” was “so obvious to the founding 
generation that it scarcely bore mention.”472 The Constitution as 
agency arrangement was mentioned at least once in the 
Founding Era,473 but this rare mention does not the Constitution 
an agency agreement make.  
As Justice Scalia said, the greatest defect of originalism is the 
difficulty of applying it correctly and plumbing the original meaning 
of the Constitution’s now ancient text.474 The difficulty and 
complexity of the historical and theoretical research that the 
dueling nondelegation scholars have engaged in is staggering. They 
have argued at great length and discord about the meaning of 
arcane texts by writers few lawyers and judges have even heard of. 
Reading their lengthy and contentious articles, one might think 
that whether the nondelegation doctrine even exists somehow turns 
on how to interpret the writings of eighteenth-century English 
natural law theorist Thomas Rutherforth, whose Institutes of 
Natural Law with its lectures on Grotius is likely missing from 
most judges’ chambers. Surely, the Framers did not intend that 
American lawyers and judges would in perpetuity require a deep 
understanding of Rutherforth’s and Locke’s writings in order to 
know something as crucial and straightforward as whether 
Congress can delegate some rule-making power to federal agencies 
and how much. The purpose of having a written Constitution is, at 
least according to some originalists, to have a clear, public, and 
compact description of the basic rules governing the United States. 
Originalism would instead turn the Constitution into an inscrutable 
document that could be understood only with a post-graduate 
education in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English and 
European legal and political theory and English history since the 
Magna Carta of 1215, with a special emphasis on the proclamations 
of Henry VIII circa 1539. 
The dueling scholars’ debate is filled with accusations of 
misunderstanding and mistakes in the other side’s historical and 
theoretical analysis, with claims such as “that their misreading 
of European delegation theory becomes the Constitution’s 
 
 472 Id. at 7. 
 473 Id. at 3 (citing 4 THE DEBATE IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 148–49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1907)). 
 474 Scalia, supra note 2, at 856. 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 12:57 PM 
2021] Originalism Isn’t What It Used to Be 789 
delegation theory, without consideration of what the Constitution 
actually said.”475 Further examples abound. “It is hard to 
overstate the ahistoricity of this claim.”476 “The historical and 
logical infirmities in Mortenson and Bagley’s analysis are 
many. . .”477 No doubt I have made errors in my historical 
analysis in this Article, since I have not been trained as a 
historian, but should the meaning of the Constitution be 
determined by the results of historical research that almost all 
lawyers and judges and even legal scholars are likely to get at 
least somewhat wrong? Some originalist Justices and scholars 
argue that Locke’s views on nondelegation and the separation of 
powers were an important influence on the framers and are 
central element of the existence of the nondelegation doctrine as 
an element of the Constitution. Yet those who would rely on 
Locke’s influence on the framers do not provide sufficient 
historical evidence regarding whether Locke’s views on 
delegation actually influenced the Framers or ratifiers, despite 
the decades of historians’ study and analysis of the rise and fall 
of Locke’s influence.478  
Justice Scalia noted the little time and less than ideal 
environment and personnel that members of the Supreme Court 
have for an “entirely accurate historical inquiry . . .”479 Justice 
Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s opinions demonstrate how 
insurmountable that challenge is. Justice Scalia tellingly did not 
share their views on nondelegation and might well have not 
agreed with their historical analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The history of the nondelegation doctrine can perhaps be 
best viewed as a conversation between James Madison and 
Justice Antonin Scalia from centuries apart. Madison feared that 
Congress would usurp the powers of the Executive and Judicial 
branches and so become tyrannical. He was willing to hand over 
some legislative power and oversight to the executive and judicial 
 
 475 HAMBURGER, supra note 119, at 383. 
 476 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 297.  
 477 Gordon, supra note 181 (manuscript at 2). 
 478 Mortenson and Bagley do spot the issue in a footnote and cite to a blog post that 
discusses it. Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 289 n.66 (citing Richard Primus, John 
Locke, Justice Gorsuch, and Gundy v. United States, BALKINIZATION (July 22, 2019), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/07/john-locke-justice-gorsuch-and-gundy-v.html 
[http://perma.cc/2EMD-78BT]). Philip Hamburger cites to the work of historians in a 
“brief sampling of the scholarship” on Locke’s influence, but does not tell readers what he 
learns from it, other than that Locke’s Two Treatises was “a crucial text for early 
Americans.” Hamburger, supra note 117, at 98 n.44. 
 479 Scalia, supra note 2, at 861. 
Do Not Delete 5/19/2021 12:57 PM 
790 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 24:3 
branches to weaken the national legislature in order protect the 
powers of the executive and judicial branches. He therefore 
advocated this sharing of some legislative power with members of 
the other branches so that, acting in concert, they could defend 
their branches from encroachment by Congress. Madison would 
have given the Council of Revision, made up mostly of judges, 
great ability to set the nation’s policy through its revisionary 
power.  
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, feared that creating a 
robust nondelegation doctrine would allow the Supreme Court to 
usurp legislative powers from Congress. Justice Scalia expressed 
fear that an invigorated nondelegation doctrine would allow the 
Court to seize too much control of policy decisions, decisions that 
should be made by Congress as a representative assembly and 
not by, as Justice Scalia put it, “a hermetically sealed committee 
of nine lawyers.”480 He recognized that the nondelegation 
doctrine is self-contradictory, in that the Court would be seizing 
legislative power in order to prevent Congress from exercising its 
own discretion and decide whether, when, and how much of its 
legislative power to delegate to federal agencies.481 The Supreme 
Court, by creating an activist nondelegation doctrine, would 
make itself Congress’s master by creating a rule that Congress is 
powerless to change. 
Embracing a robust nondelegation doctrine would make 
the Court completely unconstrained, as it would be applying a 
self-fashioned doctrine completely absent from the 
Constitution, virtually absent at the Founding, and contrary to 
the practice of the First Congress. The Court would be seizing 
the power to determine such basic policy as the reach and 
function of the administrative state and the effectiveness of 
regulation of the environment, health care, financial services, 
and countless other policies that should be determined by the 
people’s representatives in Congress, not by judges with the 
“fortitude” to seize power.  
Under the guise of preventing the “tyranny” of delegation, the 
Court would be creating a government by judiciary, making The 
Court’s Justices tyrants, the unassailable masters of the 
government, who in finding any messy evidence of some power in 
the tangled history of the Founding can construct rules not in the 
 
 480 Id. 
 481 See Scalia, supra note 354, at 28 (“[T]o a large extent judicial invocation of the 
unconstitutional delegation doctrine is a self-denying ordinance–forbidding the transfer of 
legislative power not to the agencies, but to the courts themselves.”). 
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Constitution’s text to overrule Congress and the President on even 
the most important issues about the nation’s policy and structure. 
Locke was concerned that Parliament as representative of the 
public would cede too much power to the unelected and virtually 
unremovable King. How ironic that an originalist Supreme Court 
might use Locke’s words to strip legislative power from Congress 
and grant itself a non-constitutional, ill-defined, and unconstrained 
power to veto the nation’s laws, no matter how longstanding, a 
terrifying power to be held by an unelected and virtually 
unremovable Court. 
The Court may well not to take this step. The Justices might 
review the extensive evidence of delegation and the lack of 
evidence of a nondelegation doctrine at the Founding and 
conclude that neither the original intent of the framers or 
ratifiers nor the original meaning of the Constitution justifies 
such a far-reaching seizure of power over Congress by the Court, 
overturning centuries of precedent despite such grave doubt. The 
Court could reject the arguments of some originalists and go back 
to the original concepts that first animated originalism, that the 
Court should exercise judicial restraint and in doing so protect 
Congress’s legislative powers. Only time will tell.  
 
